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NLRA Preemption Of State Common
Law Wrongful Discharge Claims: The
Bhopal Brigade Goes Home
JOSEPH R. WEEKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent history of American labor law, no other subject has
been as popular among commentators as the development of common
law causes of action for wrongful discharge. By late 1985, the subject
had been addressed with numbing redundancy in not less than sev-
enty-six major law review articles.1 With but limited opposition,2 the
* Deputy Associate Solicitor for Special Litigation, U.S. Department of Labor;
B.B.A., University of Georgia; J.D., University of Virginia; L.L.M., Georgetown Univer-
sity. The views expressed in this article are solely those of Mr. Weeks and do not nec-
essarily represent the positions of the Department of Labor, the Office of the Solicitor,
or the Special Litigation Division. A version of this article was submitted in partial
satisfaction of the requirements for the LL.M. degree at Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. See, e.g., Abramson & Silvestri, Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive
Discharge in Maryland, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 257 (1981); Bakaly, Erosion of the Employ-
ment At Will Doctrine, 8 J. CONTEMP. L. 63 (1982); Baxter & Wohl, A Special Update:
Wrongful Termination Tort Claims, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 124 (1985); Baxter &
Wohl, Wrongful Termination Lawsuits: The Employers Finally Win a Few, 10 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 258 (1984); Bierman & Youngblood, Employment at Will and the
South Carolina Experiment, 7 INDus. REL. L.J. 28 (1985); Blades, Employment at Will
vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Em-
ployment At Will Rule, 5 INDUs. REL. L.J. 471 (1983); Crook, Employment at Will: The
"American Rule" and its Application in Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 23 (1985); Decker,
At-Will Employment: Abolition and Federal Statutory Regulation, 61 U. DET. J. URB.
L. 351 (1984); Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal for its Aboli-
tion and Statutory Regulation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 477 (1983); DeGiuseppe, The Effect of
the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits,
10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981); DeGiuseppe, The Recognition of Public Policy Excep-
tions to the Employment-at-Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, 11 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 721 (1983); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947
(1984); Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976); Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An
Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984); Harrison, Wrongful
commentators have overwhelmingly agreed that employees should be
Discharge: Toward a More Efficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207 (1981); Heinsz, The As-
sault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L.
REV. 855 (1983); Hermann & Sor, Property Rights in One's Job: The Case for Limiting
Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIz. L. REV. 763 (1982); Hopkins & Robinson, Employment
at-Will, Wrongful Discharge, and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Montana, Past, Present and Future, 46 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1985); Isbell-Sirotkin, Defend-
ing the Abusively Discharged Employee: In Search of a Judicial Solution, 12 N.M.L.
REV. 711 (1982); Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Mod-
ern At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Madison, The Employee's Emerging
Right to Sue for Arbitrary or Unkfair Discharge, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422 (1981); Mal-
lur, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 449 (1985); Marrinan, Employment at-Will: Pandora's Box May Have an At-
tractive Cover, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 155 (1984); Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limita-
tions on the Right to Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65 (1982);
Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23
B.C.L. REV. 329 (1982); Naylor, Employment at Will: The Decay of an Anachronistic
Shield for Employers?, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 113 (1983); Peck, Some Kind of Hearing for
Persons Discharged from Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313 (1979); Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1979); Pierce, Mann & Roberts, Employee Termination at Will: A Principled
Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1982); Platt, Rethinking the Right of Employers to Ter-
minate At-Will Employees, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 633 (1982); Power, A Defense of the Em-
ployment at Will Rule, 27 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 881 (1983); Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will
Employment: New Theories for Job Security, 15 PAC. L.J. 759 (1984); Schreiber,
Wrongful Termination of At-Will Employees, 68 MASS. L. REV. 22 (1983); Summers,
The Rights of Individual Workers: The Contract of Employment and the Rights of In-
dividual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1082 (1984); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Vernon & Gray, Termination at Will-The Em-
ployer's Right to Fire, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 25 (1981); Individual Rights in the Work-
place: The At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 199-464 (1983); Comment, The
Employment at Will Rule, 31 ALA. L. REV. 421 (1981); Comment, Wrongful Discharge
of Employees Terminable at Will-A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 729 (1981); Comment, The At-Will Doctrine: A Proposal to Modify the Texas Em-
ployment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667 (1984); Comment, Employment at Will
and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1973); Comment, Towards a Prop-
erty Right in Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1081 (1973); Note, Job Security for the
At Will Employee: Contractual Right of Discharge for Cause, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 697
(1981); Note, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will
Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981); Comment, "Just
Cause" Termination Rights for At Will Employees, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 591; Note, Em-
ployee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196; Comment,
The Employment-at-Will Rule: The Development of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's Re-
sponse, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 477 (1983); Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note,
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Note, A Common Law Action for
the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, Employment
at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the Judicial Role, 68 IOWA L. REV. 787 (1983);
Note, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine and Non-union Airlines: Impact on both Em-
ployees and Employers, 50 J. AIR LAW & COM. 123 (1984); Comment, Termination of
the At Will Employee: The General Rule and the Wisconsin Rule, 65 MARQ. L. REV.
637 (1982); Comment, Employment at Will: When Must an Employer Have Good
Cause for Discharging an Employee?, 48 Mo. L. REV. 113 (1983); Note, Non-statutory
Causes of Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will" Employment Rela-
tionship: A Possible Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee
Relationship, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743 (1979); Comment, Wrongful Termination of
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granted relief from the sometimes harsh results produced by the
traditional employment at will doctrine under which employees not
working under an employment contract for a specified term can
either resign or be discharged at will.3
There has also been broad agreement among commentators as to
the vehicle of reform. Although there have been occasional efforts to
argue for federal legislation to protect all employees from arbitrary
dismissals,4 at least one effort to accomplish this in the closing days
of the Carter administration was unsuccessful. 5 Similarly, there has
been, to date, no indication that the federal courts are prepared to
Employees at Will: The California Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 259 (1983); Comment, Rec-
ognizing the Employee's Interests in Continued Employment-The California Cause of
Action for Unjust Dismissal, 12 PAC. L.J. 69 (1980); Comment, Beyond Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.: The Terminable-at-Will Doctrine in New Jersey, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 137 (1984); Comment, Fire at Will: An Analysis of the Missouri At Will Employ-
ment Doctrine, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 845 (1982); Comment, Missouri's Employment at
Will: Vulnerable to Prima Facie Tort?, 27 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 1001 (1983); Comment, The
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Common Ground for the Torts of Wrong-
ful Discharge from Employment, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1111 (1981); Comment,
"Good Cause": California's New "Exception" to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 263 (1983); Comment, Action for Wrongful Discharge of an Em-
ployee, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 883 (1983); Note, The Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will
Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security,
26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); Note, Ensuring Good Faith in Dismissals, 63 TEX. L. REV.
285 (1984); Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will Employment: A Review of
the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 616 (1982); Note, Em-
ployment at Will: A Proposal to Adopt the Public Policy Exception in Florida, 34 U.
FLA. L. REV. 614 (1982); Comment, Limiting the Employer's Absolute Right of Dis-
charge: Can Kansas Courts Meet the Challenge?, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 267 (1981); Note,
The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine
in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1984); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate
at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982); Note, A
Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethi-
cal or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805
(1975); Note, Retaliatory Discharge and Vermont's Need for an Exception to the
"Rule", 9 VT. L. REV. 151 (1984); Note, Employment at Will: Emerging Protections for
the Employee, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (1983); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector
At Will Employee Who "Blows the Whistle": A Cause of Action Based Upon Determi-
nants of Public Policy, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 777.
2. See, e.g., Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment at
Will Rule, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 471 (1983); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 881 (1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the
Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982).
3. See generally H. PERRITT, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.10 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine: Pro-
posed Statutory Protection for Discharges Violative of Public Policy, 47 ALB. L. REV.
466 (1983); Stieber & Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a
Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 319 (1983).
5. See Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
adopt the isolated suggestions that the at will rule can be overturned
by judicial interpretation of existing statutes6 or constitutional provi-
sions.7 This has left the state legislatures8 and, particularly, the state
courts9 as the preferred forums for effectuating the abolition of the
at-will rule.
Within the last decade, the courts have responded to the articles
written on the at-will doctrine and the litigation generated with "an
explosion"10 of decisions adopting various state law theories creating
a cause of action for wrongful discharge." In a few states, legisla-
tures have enacted statutes that limit the at-will rule in significant
respects. 12 The speed with which the states have rushed to overturn a
century-old doctrine 13 is remarkable.
In their haste to respond to the perceived inequity of the at-will
rule, the state legislatures and courts may well have overlooked a
number of less obvious virtues of the rule they are so quickly aban-
6. One commentator has argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can
be interpreted to prohibit arbitrary dismissals from employment unrelated to the
kinds of discrimination specifically prohibited by the statute. See Blumrosen, Stran-
gers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2
INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978). Blumrosen's analysis is based upon a curious interpreta-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), in which the Court held that the Title VII protection against employ-
ment discrimination based upon race included a prohibition on "reverse" discrimina-
tion against white employees.
In 1976, the Supreme Court held in McDonald that the requirement of equal
treatment applied to both whites and blacks. If an employer is required by
the operation of Title VII to have good reasons for its personnel actions with
respect to minorities and women, then, under McDonald it must apply the
same principle and standards to its white male employees. The result is a de
facto substantive law rule requiring the employer to produce good reasons or
just cause for adverse personnel actions. Thus the common law [employment
at will] rule is abolished in toto.
Blumrosen, supra, at 560 (emphasis in original).
7. The argument here is predicated upon the concept of the employer's action in
effecting the discharge being considered "government action" and the employee's job
being considered "property" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. See, e.g., Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary
Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Comment, Towards a Property Right in
Employment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1081 (1973).
8. For a review of the various proposed state statutes, see Catler, supra note 2, at
488-90.
9. The great number of articles on this subject has been partially the result of
the need to demonstrate how the existing tort and contract principles in each state can
be interpreted to include a cause of action for wrongful discharge. See supra note 1.
10. See H. PERRITT, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 1.
11. For a summary of the theories accepted by various jurisdictions, see infra
notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
12. The most common state statute proscribes the discharge of employees in retal-
iation for filing workers' compensation claims. See, e.g., 23 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1985). See also, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West
1981)(Whistleblowers' Protection Act).
13. For a summary of the historical development of the at-will rule and its recent
abandonment, see infra notes 17-62 and accompanying text.
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doning.14 Similarly, little or no attention has been given to the pre-
emption risk inherent in any state law directed to the employment
relation-a subject of substantial federal statutory regulation. 15 As a
result, state courts are writing landmark decisions creating new state
law remedies for wrongful discharge which are clearly preempted by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).16
This article will initially outline the development of the employ-
ment at will doctrine and its recent abandonment in jurisdictions
now recognizing a wrongful discharge remedy. The article will then
summarize the principles of NLRA preemption, setting forth both
the recognized areas of NLRA preemption of wrongful discharge
claims and the arguments supporting the recognition of two addi-
tional areas of preemption neither yet adopted nor even recognized
in any of the articles and decisions in this area. The article contends
that essentially all state law remedies for wrongful discharge other
than those giving contractual effect in a nonunion setting to job se-
curity provisions in an employee handbook or in personnel policies,
when made known to employees, are, and should be, preempted by
the NLRA under one or more of three existing preemption doctrines.
14. Isolated and largely unsuccessful efforts have been made to point out the
problems and inequities inherent in virtually all of the schemes advanced to create a
wrongful discharge remedy. See supra note 2.
15. Of the many articles discussing the employment at will rule and the develop-
ing law of wrongful discharge, few deal with the preemptive effect of the National La-
bor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) on such causes of action. See Comment,
NLRA Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA Preemption]; Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Dis-
charge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 942 (1983) [hereinafter cited as State Actions]. See also Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 528-31
(1976); Recent Development, The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a
Discharged Permanent Replacement Worker's State Cause of Action, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1205 (1984).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as "the NLRA" or "the
Act"]. As an example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), is the seminal case in one area of
wrongful discharge litigation. See inIfra pp. 111-12. As noted by the dissent, however,
the plaintiff in Monge was represented by a union and worked under a union contract
that included a grievance arbitration provision. Id. at 135, 316 A.2d at 553 (Grimes, J.,
dissenting). A majority of courts agree that a state law remedy for wrongful discharge
in this context is preempted by the NLRA. See infra pp. 177-97. This fact was appar-
ently never brought to the Monge court's attention.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
A. The Rise
At early common law, the master-servant relationship was viewed
as being based on status rather than contract. 17 As noted by Black-
stone, one effect of this concept was a requirement, in some circum-
stances, for "reasonable cause" to support discharge.18
By the nineteenth century, however, contractual principles re-
placed status concepts in defining the employer's right to discharge.
Under English common law, it became generally recognized that an
indefinite hiring would be presumed to be for a one-year period and
then to continue from year-to-year.19 During these successive one-
year periods, the employee could not be discharged without sever-
ance pay and notice.20
In this country, early and mid-nineteenth century decisions varied.
Some courts adopted the English rule while others utilized no such
presumption and held any employment for an indefinite term to be
terminable at will.21 The latter view became almost universally ac-
cepted, however, following the publication of H. G. Wood's treatise on
the master-servant relationship. Relying on authorities that recent
court decisions and commentators have repeatedly attacked in the
campaign to abolish the employment at will concept, 22 Wood an-
nounced what has come to be considered as the American Rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie
a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the
17. DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights
to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 3-5 (1981). For a more
complete explanation of the historical development of the at-will doctrine, see
Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118, 119-22 (1976); Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Rela-
tionship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457, 457-61 (1979); Summers,
supra note 15, at 484-91; Note, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 211, 212-16 (1973); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-28
(1980); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1435, 1438-43 (1975).
18. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (1878).
19. See, e.g., Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827) which states:
If a master hire a servant, without mention of time, that is a general hiring
for a year, and if the parties go on four, five, or six years, a jury would be
warranted in presuming a contract for a year in the first instance, and so on
for each succeeding year, as long as it should please the parties: such a con-
tract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is not
necessary to authenticate it.
20. See Feinman, supra note 17 at 119-20.
21. See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335, 340-41 (1974).
22. See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
3166 (Ariz. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 601, 292
N.W.2d 880, 886 (1980); Note, supra note 21, at 341-42 & n.54 (1974); St. Antoine, You're
Fired!, 10 HUM. RTS. 32, 33-35 (1982).
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burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week,
month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no pre-
sumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
whatever time the party may serve.
2 3
The New York Court of Appeals noted that, under this rule,24 an em-
ployee hired for an indefinite term could be discharged for good
cause, no cause, or even bad cause.25
The acceptance of the American Rule was accelerated by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Adair v. United States26 and Coppage v.
Kansas.27 In these cases, the Court found to be unconstitutional fed-
eral and state statutes that imposed criminal penalties on employers
discharging employees because of union membership. Finding that
such statutes violated the concepts of freedom of contract and free-
dom of enterprise, the Court held that they therefore violated the
substantive due process components of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is,
in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to
sell it. So the right of the employ6 [sic] to quit the service of the employer, for
whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever rea-
son, to dispense with the services of such employ6 [sic]. 28
Although Adair and Coppage, together with the concept of sub-
stantive due process upon which these decisions were based, would
later be rejected by the Supreme Court,29 Wood's American Rule was
adopted by courts in virtually every American jurisdiction.30 More-
over, the rule grew from simply a rebuttable presumption of employ-
ment terminable at will to a rule of substantive law that, in many
jurisdictions, could not be overcome simply by affirmative proof of a
different agreement.31 Although there continued to be occasional ex-
23. H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1887).
24. This rule will hereinafter be referred to as the "American Rule" or the "em-
ployment at will rule."
25. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
26. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
27. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
28. Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.
29. See Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S.
548 (1930)(upholding constitutionality of Railway Labor Act); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding constitutionality of National Labor
Relations Act).
30. See, e.g., C. LABATT, 1 MASTER & SERVANT § 160, at 159 (1913)("The pre-
ponderence of American authority in favor of the doctrine that an indefinite hiring is
presumptively a hiring at will is so great that it is now scarcely open to criticism.").
31. See H. PERRITr, supra note 3, §1.3, at 6-7. For example, contracts admittedly
for "permanent" employment were held to be merely contracts for indefinite employ-
ceptions in the application of the rule,3 2 and the legislative process
provided significant direct and indirect protection against wrongful or
arbitrary discharge for certain categories of employees,33 the at-will
rule was not seriously challenged in the courts until recently.34
B. The Fall
1. Public Policy Cases
The case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 396,35 is commonly cited as the beginning of the development
of modern wrongful discharge causes of action.36 Petermann, an at-
will employee, had allegedly been discharged because he had refused
ment and, thus, terminable at will in the absence of some additional consideration
from the employee. See, e.g., Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 568,
278 N.W. 687, 689 (1938). See generally Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1432 (1925). For a recent ju-
dicial discussion of this transformation of Wood's rule, see Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600-09, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885-90 (1980). See also Morris v.
Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 680, 340 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1983)(stating case for
at-will rule as only one of rebuttable presumption). '
32. See, e.g., Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 976, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114
(1950)(rebuttable presumption only); Hoffman Speciality Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586,
594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932) (rebuttable presumption only).
33. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 Stat. 539, 555 § 6 (1912), provided the first sub-
stantive protection for federal employees against discharge other than for cause. See
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1983). The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982), provides a statutory arbitration procedure for employee claims of wrongful dis-
charge in the railroad and airline industries when a union is recognized and the usual
"just cause" provision is contained in the collective bargaining agreement. Similarly,
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982), and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982), provide a procedure for union-repre-
sented employees to enforce collective bargaining agreements, which in the great
majority of cases contain both a "just cause" requirement for discharge and provisions
establishing an arbitration procedure for resolving claims of a violation of such a re-
quirement. See infra notes 310-12 and accompanying text. The Veterans' reemploy-
ment statutes also contain provisions requiring "cause" for the discharge of the
reemployed veteran for certain time periods. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b)(1), 2024(c)
(1982).
In addition to these general "just cause" provisions for certain groups, federal legis-
lation has sought to prohibit the discharge of employees for certain prescribed reasons.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982)(proscribing discharge of employees on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982)(proscrib-
ing discharge for employees on basis of age); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982)(proscribing
discharge of employees for exercise of rights under employee benefit plans); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1674(a) (1982)(proscribing discharge of employees for having been subjected to
garnishment).
34. As late as 1975, an A.L.R. annotation on the subject stated that "few legal
principles would seem to be better settled than the broad generality that an employ-
ment for an indefinite term is regarded as an employment at will which may be termi-
nated at any time by either party for any reason or for no reason at all." Annot., 62
A.L.R.3D 271, 271 (1975)(noting isolated exceptions recognized to that point). By 1982,
this annotation had been superceeded. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4TH 544 (1982). See also
Annot., 33 A.L.R.4TH 120 (1984); Annot., 32 A.L.R.4TH 1221 (1984); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4TH
329 (1981).
35. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
36. See H. PERRITT, supra note 3, § 1.8, at 10.
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to follow instructions from his employer that would have required
him to perjure himself before a state legislative committee.37
Although the opinion is far from clear, the California appellate court
held that considerations of public policy limit an employer's right to
discharge an at-will employee.38
The opinion is somewhat ambiguous, however, to the extent that
the court also appeared to rely, in part, upon the fact that the plain-
tiff had allegedly received oral assurances that he would be employed
"for such period as his work was satisfactory. . . ." and had been in-
formed on the day of his testimony before the committee "that 'his
work was highly satisfactory.' "39 Under these circumstances, the
court held that "it is well settled that the employer must act in good
faith; and where there is evidence tending to show that the discharge
was due to reasons other than dissatisfaction with the services the
question is one for the jury."40 However, the latter rationale is gen-
erally ignored, and Petermann is commonly cited as having recog-
nized a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the reason for
the discharge violates the public policy of the state.41
Presently, thirty-six American jurisdictions have decisions which
either recognize a common law action for wrongful discharge based
upon a violation of public policy or indicate a judicial willingness to
37. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 344 P.2d at 27.
38. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
39. Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 28.
40. Id. This appears to be a make-weight argument. Similar to virtually every
other state, the law in California had always been that employees hired "for life" or
for "permanent" employment, or for any of other similar formulations of indefinite
employment, could nevertheless be discharged with or without cause or notice, unless
the employee had given some kind of additional consideration beyond his services to
support the "lifetime" employment or, in some cases, had detrimentally relied on the
offer of permanent employment. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d
139, 149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845, 852 (1975). See generally DeGiuseppi, supra note 17, at 10-
14.
41. See, e.g., H. PERRIT, supra note 3, § 1.8, at 11. The exact nature of the cause of
action has changed, however. Petermann was a breach of contract action. Subse-
quently, the California courts recognized that an action in tort will also lie for an al-
leged discharge in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). The tort cause of action has
been the most common in other jurisdictions recognizing a right of action in this con-
text and "public policy" cases are now so generally brought as torts that they have
been, at times, described exclusively in such terms. See, e.g., DeGiuseppi, The Recogni-
tion of Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule: A Legislative Func-
tion?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 745-53 (1983); Comment, The At-Will Doctrine: A
Proposal to Modify the Texas Employment Relationship, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 667, 675-84
(1984).
do so in an appropriate future case.42 In the near future, courts in
42. The conduct of the employee allegedly resulting in a discharge of a type held
to violate the state's public policy is shown parenthetically. Arizona: Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3166 (Ariz. 1985) (refused to
commit criminal act); Arkansas: Lucus v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir.
1984) (refused to sleep with foreman); California: Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refused to participate in price-fix-
ing); Colorado: Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(refused to check sensors in tank of truck because of health hazard); Lampe v. Presby-
terian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978) (refused to reduce over-
time work of her nurses); Connecticut: Sheetz v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (insisted that employer comply with Food,'Drug, and
Cosmetics Act); District of Columbia: Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 121 LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 2962 (D.D.C. 1986); Florida: Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional
Admins., 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983) (pursued workers' compensation claim); Hawaii:
Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982)(discharged to pre-
vent testimony before grand jury); Idaho: MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108
Idaho 588, 701 P.2d 208 (1985) (failed to carry out directions of supervisor); Illinois:
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (supplied information
to police and intended to testify at trial); Indiana: Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (filed workers' compensation claim); Martin v.
Platt, 179 Ind. App. 688, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979) (general "public policy" right of action
refused); Iowa: Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (made
untrue statements reflecting integrity of employer); Kansas: Anco Constr. Co. v. Free-
man, 236 Kan. 626, 693 P.2d 1183 (1985) (protested wages); Kentucky: Firestone Textile
Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (filed workers' compensation claim);
Louisana: Wiley v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied,
431 So. 2d 1055 (La. 1983) (asserted FELA claim); Maine: MacDonald v. Eastern Fine
Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228 (Me. 1984) (filed workers' compensation claim); Maryland:
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (alleged employer
paying bribes and falsifying records); Massachusetts: Stepanischen v. Merchants Des-
patch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983) (participated in union-organizing activ-
ities); Michigan: Trombetta v. Detroit Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265
N.W.2d 385 (1978) (refused to falsify pollution control reports); Montana: Keneally v.
Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980) (complained that company not fulfilling
promises to customers); Nebraska: Mueller v. Union Pac. R.R., 220 Neb. 742, 371
N.W.2d 732 (1985) (violated campaign disclosure laws); Nevada: Hansen v. Harrah's,
100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984) (filed workers' compensation claim); New Hampshire:
Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (refused to
make weekend bank deposits); New Jersey: Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (contended ingredient in drug was controversial and de-
clined further investigation); North Carolina: Sides v. Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331,
328 S.E.2d 818 (1985)(refused to give false testimony); North Dakota: Wadeson v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984) (refused to communicate
and cooperate with supervisors); Oregon: Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975)(performed jury duty); Pennsylvania: Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1983) (refused to participate in lobbying); Tennessee: Clanton v. Cain-
Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984)(filed workers' compensation claim); Texas:
Hauck v. Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733
(Tex. 1985) (refused to commit illegal act); Virginia: Bowman v. State Bank, 229 Va.
534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985) (exercised right to vote as stockholder); Washington: Roberts
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977) (challenged termination
based upon age); West Virginia: Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d
270 (1978) (insisted that employer comply with law); Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), rev'd, 54 U.S.L.W. 2331 (1985) (had
affair with secretary and smoked marijuana); Wyoming: Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985) (spoke in derogatory fashion to customers).
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many of the remaining jurisdictions can be expected to follow suit.43
2. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Cases
The modern concept of an implied covenant of "good faith and fair
dealing" inherently present in all contracts 44 was first applied to the
termination of an at-will employee in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.45
The plaintiff in Monge had allegedly been discharged because she had
refused to succumb to the romantic overtures of her supervisor. Per-
ceiving a need for the employment at will rule "to conform to mod-
ern circumstances,"46 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
''a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will
which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation...
constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 47
Although, like Petermann, Monge was a contract case and did not
expressly rely on the duty of "good faith and fair dealing," the case
was soon cited as authority for this concept 48 and it eventually devel-
oped into primarily a tort rather than a contract action.49 At present
there have been decisions in eight American jurisdictions in which
the court has either allowed recovery under the "good faith and fair
dealing" concept or indicated in dicta that it may do so in the fu-
ture.50 On the other hand, courts in ten jurisdictions have expressly
43. At least one court has viewed this expansion as inevitable. See Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3166, 3172 (Ariz. June 17,
1985)("[N]o court faced with a termination that violated a 'clear mandate of public pol-
icy' has refused to adopt the public policy exception."). This is, however, clearly an
overstatement. Courts in at least nine jurisdictions have recently refused to recognize
a public policy exception to the employment at will rule. See, e.g., Alabama: Meeks v.
Opp Cotton Mills, 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984); Georgia: Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson,
Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981); Missouri: Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc); Mississippi: Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981);
New Mexico: Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (1981); New
York: Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Ohio: Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 122 LAB. REL. REP. 2163
(Oh. 1986); Vermont: Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
44. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 568, at 326 (1960); 5 S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 670, at 158-59 (3d ed. 1961); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
45. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
46. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 103-04, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (1977).
49. The New Hampshire Supreme Court later also began to cite Monge for this
concept. See Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140,
1143 (1981).
50. Alaska: Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); California: Cancel-
considered and rejected this concept as an exception to the employ-
ment at will rule.51 As at least one commentator has noted, it appears
that the implied good faith and fair dealing requirement as a limita-
tion to the at-will rule has seen its high point.52
3. Limitations on Discharge Implied From Employer's Personnel
Policies or Employee Handbook
The public policy and "good faith and fair dealing" exceptions to
the at-will doctrine clearly constitute major revisions to the employ-
ment at will rule imposed by the courts. The same impulse fueling
this trend has also led to a significant change in the judicial interpre-
tation of the contractual effect of an employer's personnel policies or
employee handbook. The effect of this change on the rapid abandon-
ment of the employment at will rule has been equally as severe in
this area, however.
As late as the publication of DeGiuseppe's two exhaustive surveys
of the law in this area in 1981 and 1983, with very few exceptions
courts viewed personnel policies and employee handbooks as unilat-
eral expressions of company policy that did not create enforceable
rights to job security.5 3 By late 1985, this could no longer be said.
Often citing one or both of the major cases in this area, Toussaint
lier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Connecticut: Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781
(1984); Iowa: High v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984); Massachusetts:
Kravetz v. Merchants Distrib., Inc., 387 Mass. 457, 440 N.E.2d 1278 (1982); Minnesota:
Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980); Eklund
v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. App. 1984), pet. for rev. de-
nied, 361 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. 1984); Montana: Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co.,
687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984); New Hampshire: Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981)(also requiring a public policy violation as a required ele-
ment for recovery); cf. North Dakota: Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343
N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984).
51. Arizona: Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
3166 (Ariz. 1985); Arkansas: Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Ark. 1982); Georgia: Gunn v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291
S.E.2d 779 (1982); Hawaii: Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 652 P.2d 625
(1982); Illinois: Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Martin
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982); Maine: Poirier v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 2086 (Me. Super. Ct. 1983); New
York: Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, (1983); Utah: Kelly v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)
2110 (D. Utah 1983); Washington: Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219,
685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335
N.W.2d 834 (1983).
52. Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will Employment: A Review of the
Case Law From Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 616, 625 (1982).
53. See DeGiueseppi, supra note 17, at 45 (quoting Johnson v. National Beef Pack-
ing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976) (personnel policy manual)); DeGiuseppi, supra
note 41, at 779 (quoting Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063
(1982)(employee handbook)).
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v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MichiganS4 and Weiner v. McGraw-
Hill, Inc.,55 courts in seventeen jurisdictions have now either held or
suggested that the employer's right to discharge at will may be lim-
ited by its personnel policies or employee handbook.56 Although
courts in eleven jurisdictions have expressly rejected this concept, 57
it probably is an idea that will become more widely accepted in the
very near future.58
54. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
55. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
56. Arizona: Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (1984); California: Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Colorado: Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. App. 1984);
Salimi v. Farmers Ins, Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo. App. 1984); Idaho: MacNeil v. Mini-
doka Memorial Hosp., 701 P.2d 208 (Idaho 1985); Maryland: Staggs v. Blue Cross of
Maryland, Inc., 61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493,
A.2d 349 (1985); Michigan: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980); Minnesota: Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622
(Minn. 1983); Missouri: Enyeart v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. App.
1985); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. App. 1983); Nevada: Southwest Gas
Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983); New Jersey: Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); New Mexico: Hernandez v. Home Educa-
tion Livelihood Program, Inc., 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381 (1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M.
336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982); New York: Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443
N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, (1982); Ohio: Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1,
472 N.E.2d 765 (1984); Oregon: Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d
1276 (1982); Pennsylvania: Wagner v. Sperry Univac, Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1980); South Dakota: Osterkamp
v. Alkota Mfg., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Washington: Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). Compare also Illinois: Carter v. Kas-
kaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974)(recogniz-
ing personnel manual as source of contractual rights against discharge at will) with
Enis v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(no contractual protection against discharge at will can be drawn from employee hand-
book) and Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443
(1979)(same); Nebraska: Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d
388 (1983)(handbook recognized as basis for contractual protection) with Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980)(refusing to give contractual
effect to employee handbook).
57. Delaware: Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Florida:
La Rocca v. Xerox Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Georgia: White v. I.T.T.,
718 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 968 (1984); Indiana: Shaw v. S. S.
Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Iowa: Luft v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2704 (D. Iowa 1984); Kansas: Johnson v. National Beef Packing
Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Louisana: Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So.
2d 637 (La. App. 1982); Maine: Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135
(Me. 1977); Montana: Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063
(1982); Texas; Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App. 1982); Wiscon-
sin: Holloway v. K-Mart Corp., 113 Wis. 2d 143, 334 N.W.2d 570 (1983).
58. This prediction is based on the contradiction inherent in refusing to recognize
the effect of an employer's discharge procedures. A policy under which an employer
4. Other Exceptions
In addition to the major exceptions to the employment at will con-
cept discussed above, courts in several jurisdictions have recognized a
variety of different claims by discharged employees that also have
the practical effect of significantly diluting the employment at will
concept in the few jurisdictions allowing such claims. The most com-
mon claims of this nature are intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress5 9 and promissory estoppel. 60 Other than in jurisdictions that
recognize one of the more common wrongful discharge claims, claims
of this nature probably will not be allowed to any significant
extent.6 1
C. The Significance
For purposes of this article, there are two rather obvious conclu-
sions that can be drawn from the history of the employment at will
rule. First, for more than 100 years in this country, rightly or
wrongly, the concept that, absent express contractual limitation, an
employee could quit or be discharged at will was given virtually uni-
versal acceptance. Second, within just the last several years, this con-
states that it will discharge employees only for cause or will preceed discharge with
progressive discipline or specified procedural steps will certainly be viewed by employ-
ees as a benefit and is presumably intended to be viewed as such by the employer. An-
alytically, there is no logical distinction between a benefit of this nature and other
benefits such as pay scales, severance pay, vacation policies, sick leave, and pension
programs, which are all commonly held to be contractual entitlements when they are
made known to employees. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 17, at 50-68. Differently ex-
pressed, there is nothing that can be said in support of an employer's termination pro-
cedures not being enforceable that could not also be said in support of any of its other
announced employment benefits not being enforceable. But for an unjustified judicial
inertia resulting from the long history of Wood's American Rule, the contradictory ju-
dicial attitude toward termination procedures and other unilaterally established em-
ployer policies would not exist. With the spreading abandonment of that rule, the
courts can be expected to become more and more receptive to efforts to enforce the
intended reliance by employees on such termination procedures.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engi-
neering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Agis v. Howard John-
son Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). See, e.g., Rawson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982); Grouse v. Group Health Plan,
Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302
N.W.2d 307 (1981).
61. The attitude of the New York Court of Appeals is probably typical of the reac-
tion of most courts that refuse to recognize any of the more common exceptions to the
at-will doctrine.
Further, in light of our holding above that there is now no cause of action in
tort in New York for abusive or wrongful discharge of an at-will employee,
plaintiff should not be allowed to evade that conclusion or to subvert the
traditional at-will contract rule by casting his cause of action in terms of a tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress ....
Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303, 448 N.E.2d 86, 90, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1983).
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cept has now been abandoned to at least some extent in most
jurisdictions by the adoption of one or more common law theories
under which discharged employees are allowed to challenge their
employer's action.62 Federal law already provides a mechanism by
which employees may be protected against arbitrary or unjust dis-
charge, however, and has done so for fifty years. We will now ex-
amine the extent to which the federal law and the new state
remedies can coexist.
III. THE THREE DOCTRINES OF NLRA PREEMPTION APPLIED TO
STATE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE REMEDIES
It would be difficult to construct an argument against Judge Wis-
dom's view that "[l]abor preemption is a complex and confused area
of the law."63 Although, in the labor context as elsewhere, the ques-
tion of whether federal legislation preempts state law directed to the
same conduct ostensibly turns on the intent of Congress, 6 4 no effort
has ever been made by Congress to indicate its intent with respect to
the Labor Management Relations Act.65 As a result, the Supreme
Court has been required to construct rules of general application that
are often justified in language of apology. 66 Its efforts have satisfied
62. In addition to the common law theories previously discussed, many states have
adopted legislative remedies for certain categories of discharged employees. See gener-
ally DeGiuseppe, supra note 17, at 738-44. For purposes of federal preemption, legisla-
tive remedies are subject to the same analysis as common law remedies.
63. Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.
1984).
64. Metropolitian Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380, 2393 (1985); Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1910 (1985). But see C. MORRIS, THE DEVEL-
OPING LABOR LAW 1504-08 (2d ed. 1983) (the Court has essentially abandoned the os-
tensible effort to base preemption decisions on the will of Congress and has now
recognized that its decisions turn on policy choices made by the Court itself).
65. .Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953). See also Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395, 1402-03 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). This has not been the uniform practice with respect to all labor statutes.
More recent enactments have largely avoided the preemption problems under the
NLRA by expressly indicating an intent either to preempt or preserve state remedies.
Compare, e.g., The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1982)(expressly preempting state law with specified exceptions) with The Labor Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 523 (1982)(expressly saving state
law except as indicated in the statute).
66. "[T]he statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States
and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concrete-
ness by the process of litigating elucidation." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959) (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958)).
virtually no one.6 7
With respect to the evolving law of wrongful discharge litigation,
the Court has not yet accepted a case presenting the preemption
question. 68 Inasmuch as a conflict already arguably exists within the
circuits,6 9 however, it presumably will soon do so. Depending upon
the factual context of such a case, there exist three distinct preemp-
tion doctrines that may be implicated.70 Each is discussed seperately
below.
A. The Garmon Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court's efforts to formulate preemption
standards under the NLRA and the Labor Management Relations
Act71 date back to the earliest days of the NLRA, the current stan-
67. See, e.g., B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 595-96
(2d ed. 1977); Brody, Labor Preemption Again-After the Searing of Garmon, 13 Sw.
U.L. REV. 201 (1982); Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted
Trespassory Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552 (1970); Bryson, A Matter of Wooden
Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1037, 1041 (1973);
Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the
Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970); Cox, Recent Developments in Fed-
eral Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Updegraff, Preemption, Pre-
dictability and Progress in Labor Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 473 (1966); Note, Labor Law
Preemption After Belknap, Inc. v. Hale: Has Preemption as Usual Been Permanently
Replaced?, 17 IND. L. REV. 491 (1984); Note, Union Trespass: The Dilemma of Federal
Preemption of State Jurisdiction, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 929 (1977).
68. The Court recently declined to review two of the leading cases in this context
at the circuit court level. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985); Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717
F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1000 (1984).
69. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recently held state law "public policy"
wrongful discharge actions not preempted by the LMRA in the context of employees
protected by a collective bargaining agreement containing a "just cause" provision. See
Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2319 (1985); Peabody Galion v. A. V. Dollar,.666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981). In the
context of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982), the Seventh Circuit has
held a public policy claim in a similar context preempted. Jackson v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
70. As set out in the text, the applicability of each of the three doctrines is in large
part a function of the type of wrongful discharge cause of action being considered and
whether the employee in question was represented by a union and protected by the
"just cause" provision of a collective bargaining agreement.
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as "the LMRA"]. The rela-
tionship between the LMRA and the NLRA needs to be understood to avoid confusion
resulting from the Court's terminology. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959)(seeming to use "LMRA" and "NLRA" as syno-
nyms). The NLRA (National Labor Relations Act) is the original New Deal statute
enacted in 1935. The LMRA (Labor Management Relations Act), enacted in 1947, both
substantially added to and changed- the NLRA. The amended version of the NLRA
became subchapter II of the LMRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 167 (1982). The LMRA is the en-
tire statute as currently codified, including the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1982).
All of the three preemption doctrines discussed in the text that are applicable to
wrongful discharge actions are based on section 7 and section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158 (1982). A fourth doctrine, relied on by some courts in this context but actu-
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dard under which most preemption questions in this context are
tested was established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon.72 At issue in Garmon, as in every case under this branch of
preemption analysis, was an application of state law to conduct that
was asserted to have been either protected by section 7 or prohibited
by section 8 of the NLRA.73 Prior to Garmon, it had been established
that both the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 74
and concepts of primary jurisdiction 75 preempted state law in both
contexts.76 The significance of Garmon is that the Court recognized
ally inapplicable, is based on section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). See in-
fra note 387 and accompanying text.
72. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
73. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, protects the right of employees to organize or join
labor unions or to otherwise act in concert for "mutual aid or protection." The scope of
this protection has been defined by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"the Board" in this article) in terms of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which pro-
hibits employer interference with employees' section 7 rights. Section 8(a) also prohib-
its other employer conduct such as dominating a union (section 8(a)(2)), discriminating
against employees to encourage or discourage union membership (section 8(a)(3)), dis-
criminating against employees who file charges or testify in a proceeding under the
Act (section 8(a)(4)), and refusing to bargain in good faith (section 8(a)(5)). In addition,
section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. §158(b), which was added to the NLRA by the LMRA, prohibits
specified union conduct such as interference with employees' section 7 rights (section
8(b)(1)(A)), causing employers to discriminate against employees in violation of section
8(a)(3) (section 8(b)(2)), refusing to bargain in good faith (section 8(b)(3)), engaging in
secondary boycotts, "hot cargo" agreements, and certain jurisdictional coercion (section
8(b)(4)), requiring excessive initiation fees for membership in the union (section
8(b)(5)), extracting money from employers for work not performed (section 8(b)(6)),
and violating specified organizational picketing rules (section 8(b)(7)). For an up to
date and exhaustive survey of the law under the NLRA and the LMRA, see Morris,
supra note 64.
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
75. As used in this context, the concept of "primary jurisdiction" refers to the in-
tent of Congress that the NLRB, subject to federal appellate court review, be the sole
means of enforcement of the NLRA to the total exclusion of state courts. See, e.g.,
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242-44; Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91
(1953). Used in this manner, the term is distinguishable from the same term as it is
usually employed in the administrative law context in which it means simply the re-
quirement that the administrative body be given the opportunity to initially pass on
an issue. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 199 n.29 (1978)(quoting K. DAVIS, 3 ADMIN. LAW TREATISE, § 19.01, at 3
(1958)).
76. See generally Garner, 346 U.S. at 488-91. The necessity for preemption under
the supremacy clause of conduct protected by section 7 is fairly obvious. It has long
been recognized that state law cannot be applied to conflict with federal law. See Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). If the NLRA expressly protects in section 7
certain conduct by employees, state law obviously cannot be allowed to prohibit or pe-
nalize the employee's engaging in such conduct. See Brown v. Hotel Employees' Union
Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186 (1984)("If employee conduct is protected under § 7, then
state law which interferes with the exercise of these federally protected rights creates
expressly in this case that the principles supporting preemption were
sufficiently compelling to require preemption even where the con-
duct in question could only be said to be arguably protected or pro-
hibited by the Act. "When an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8
of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the
danger of state interference with national policy is to be avoided." 77
Although burdened with many exceptions, 78 Garmon remains today
at least the ostensible doctrinal foundation for the Court's approach
to preemption in this context.79
The application of the Garmon doctrine to state law wrongful dis-
charge claims would not seem to involve any significant analytical
problems-at least in its initial steps. The analysis requires an exam-
ination of the conduct being regulated by the state-in this case an
employer's discharge of an employee-and a determination whether
this conduct is either arguably protected by section 7 or arguably pro-
hibited by section 8 of the NLRA. Since only employee rights are se-
cured under section 7, the employer's right to discharge free from
state law restrictions cannot be protected by section 7. Thus, the
analysis is reduced to a determination in each case whether the em-
ployer's discharge is one that is arguably prohibited by section 8. If
so, the state cause of action is preempted unless it can be shown to
fall within one of the Garmon exceptions.80
an actual conflict and is preempted by direct operation of the Supremacy Clause.").
This is obviously the most compelling case for preemption and one that will permit
none of the exceptions developed under the primary jurisdiction rationale. See, e.g.,
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 n.9 (1985)(quoting Brown v. Ho-
tel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186 (1984)).
The necessity for preemption of conduct prohibited by section 8 under the primary
jurisdiction rationale is not so immediately apparent. An argument can be made that,
in the admitted absence of express congressional intent to preempt state law in this
context, states should be free to prohibit with their own remedies and forums the
kinds of conduct that are also prohibited by the NLRA. Cf. Amalgamated Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 302-05 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing)(summarizing, in a different context, the disadvantages of NLRB procedures when
compared to those available in state courts). Ultimately, however, the Court has recog-
nized a congressional purpose to permit the NLRB alone, subject to federal appellate
review, to adjudicate disputes of the type governed by the NLRA. See, e.g., Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1061-62
(1986); Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 285-91. Moreover, although not always recognized by the
Court, the supremacy clause may well require the same preemptive effect on state law
in the context of state efforts to punish or regulate conduct prohibited by the Act as it
does with respect to state efforts to regulate conduct protected by the Act. See infra
notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
77. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
78. One commentator views the exceptions as having proliferated to the point that
"the Garmon test can now be described only by reference to its exceptions." Bryson,
supra note 67, at 1041.
79. See, e.g., Belknap, Inc., v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 507-09 (1983); Local 926, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 675-76 (1983).
80. In light of the relative simplicity of this analytic framework, it is to some ex-
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Certain kinds of employee conduct such as attempting to organize
support among fellow employees for a union are so obviously pro-
tected by section 7 that a discharge by the employer allegedly to re-
taliate against or halt such conduct necessarily states a claim under
section 8.81 A state law cause of action providing a remedy for such a
tent surprising that the two commentators who have most extensively examined the
question of NLRA preemption of wrongful discharge claims have both failed to ad-
dress it. In one instance, Garmon was recognized as "protect[ing] the exclusive juris-
diction of the [NLRB] to enforce the specific protection of Section 7 and the specific
prohibitions of Section 8 of the NLRA." NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 642-43.
Apparently considering the existence of collective bargaining agreements to present
the only significant preemption problem in this context, however, the commentator
concluded that "this area [of the Garmon doctrine] generally is not relevant to pre-
emption of the typical wrongful discharge claim." Id.
In the other instance, the Garmon doctrine was recognized as applicable but the
analysis was directed to an examination of the kinds of employee conduct for which
the employee had allegedly been discharged to determine whether this was protected
by section 7. "Under the Garmon rule, a state wrongful discharge action will be pre-
empted if the employee's conduct giving rise to the termination is arguably protected
by the NLRA and an exception does not apply." State Actions, supra note 15, at 957.
The obvious problem with this approach is that the state makes no effort to regulate or
restrict such protected conduct by employees when it provides a state forum for hear-
ing claims that, as a result of such conduct, the employee has been discharged. It is the
employer who has allegedly penalized by discharge the exercise of the employee's pro-
tected section 7 rights. Such conduct by the employer is, of course, a violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and the preemption analysis therefore must focus not on the "arguably
protected by Section 7" branch of Garmon but on the "arguably prohibited by section
8" branch. Superficially, it might seem that this is a meaningless distinction inasmuch
as a discharge normally will not be arguably prohibited by section 8(a)(1) in this con-
text unless the employee's conduct for which he was assertedly discharged is at least
arguably protected by section 7. But see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
Because of this, the inquiry normally will turn in any event on whether the conduct of
the employee for which he was assertedly discharged was protected by section 7. How-
ever, while this is correct so far as it goes, it ignores the fact that there is a critical
difference between the "arguably protected" and the "arguably prohibited" branches
of the Garmon doctrine, at least under the Supreme Court's most recent analysis in
this area. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has recently taken the position
that the inquiry under the "arguably protected" branch of Garmon begins and ends
with a determination of whether the conduct the state has sought to regulate is argua-
bly protected. If so, the state is preempted "by direct operation the Supremacy Clause"
or, differently expressed, "as a matter of substantive right." Brown v. Hotel Employ-
ees Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186-87 (1984). See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 n.9 (1985). No balancing of federal and state interests is permit-
ted in this context. Id. Since, as set out in the text, many, or even most, of the recog-
nized state law public policy wrongful discharge actions involve discharges for
employee conduct that is at least arguably protected under section 7, application of the
"arguably protected" branch of Garmon to this context would lead to a conclusion that
all such actions are preempted. By contrast, application of the "arguably prohibited"
branch of Garmon requires a close examination of the specific nature of the action and
the interests in question to resolve the preemption question.
81. Indeed, the position of the NLRB has historically been that, under section
8(a)(1), not even the intent element that normally would be required under state law
discharge therefore involves an effort to regulate conduct prohibited
by section 8 and is preempted under Garmon if none of the Garmon
exceptions are applicable. As the protection of the efforts of employ-
ees to organize is one of the primary purposes of the NLRA,82 courts
have had little difficulty in concluding that state law remedies in this
context are preempted.8 3
The preemption of state law wrongful discharge actions in which
the asserted basis for the discharge is the employee's union organiza-
tion efforts is neither particularly surprising nor a significant threat
to the continued viability of such actions in general. There exists
under Garmon a far more interesting and threatening potential for
the preemption of state wrongful discharge remedies, however.
The most widely accepted exception to the employment at will rule
is the "public policy" cause of action recognized in many states as
available to employees allegedly discharged for a reason violative of
the state's public policy.8 4 Within this category, the public policy ex-
ception has been applied to protect against retaliatory discharge em-
ployees who have done such things as file workers' compensation
claims, refuse to commit or cover up illegal acts, or report their em-
ployer's safety or health violations.85 There has existed in the past,
and may still exist, however, a substantial basis for concluding that
all such state claims are preempted under Garmon.
need be shown. The employer violates the statute without regard to any intent to re-
taliate against, or halt, protected employee conduct when he engages in conduct that
might reasonably be thought to have interfered with the free exercise by employees of
their section 7 rights. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 393 (1980), en-
forcement denied, 647 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1981); American Freightways Co., 124
N.L.R.B. 146 (1959). Although the position of the Supreme Court on this issue is un-
clear, see, e.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965); C.
MORRIS, supra note 64, at 76-78; Christensen & Syanoe, Motive and Intent in the Com-
mission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77
YALE L.J. 1269 (1968), the inquiry under Garmon is whether the employer's conduct is
arguably prohibited and, in the absence of definitive Supreme Court guidance to the
contrary, any position taken by the NLRB will, by that fact alone, almost necessarily
be sufficient to establish at least its "arguable" validity. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)(NLRB construction of statute if "reasonably defensible
... should not be rejected merely because the courts might prefer another view of the
statute."); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 496-501 (1978)(recognizing congres-
sional intent to permit NLRB to develop and apply fundamental national labor policy).
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
83. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Western Elec. Co., 758 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1985); Vies-
tenz v. Fleming Cos. 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); Ramsey
v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1980); Sitek v. Forest City Enter.,
Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479
(E.D. Mich. 1982); Henry v. Intercontinental Radio, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 707, 711, 202
Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984); Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 189, 649 P.2d 1119 (1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 904 (1983). But see Hafner v. Clinton Care Center, Inc., 118 LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) 2740 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1985)(supervisor's claim of breach of implied
contract when allegedly discharged for union activity not preempted).
84. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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Employee rights under section 7 are not limited to organizational
activities; they also include the right of employees to "engage in
other concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection."8 6
Although the use of the term "concerted" would seem to imply a re-
quirement for collective action by employees to fall within the sec-
tion 7 protection, the Board in 1966 adopted a "per se" concerted
activity doctrine under which an individual employee, acting alone, is
recognized as engaging in protected concerted activity when he acts
to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.8 7 In
1975, this doctrine of constructive concerted activity was expanded in
Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc.88 to include situations in which there ex-
isted no collective bargaining agreement and the employee was not
represented by a union. At its apex, the Alleluia doctrine held pro-
tected, and thus provided a remedy under section 8(a)(1) for dis-
charges in retaliation for, such individual employee conduct as filing
a safety complaint with a state agency,8 9 filing an overtime complaint
with the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor,90
the filing of a national origin discrimination complaint,91 and the fil-
ing, or expression of an intent to file, a workers' compensation
claim.92 The Board's rationale in all such cases was that an individ-
ual engages in concerted activity whenever he acts in a matter that
arises out of the employment relationship and which may be of com-
mon interest to other employees, since it is reasonable to presume
that other employees, had they known of the complaint, would have
joined in. 9 3
Although the Board's constructive concerted activity concept, the
86. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See also Eastex, Inc., v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). See
generally C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 73-75.
87. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295 (1966), enkforced, 388 F.2d 495 (2d
Cir. 1967). See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 738 (1982). This policy was recently
accepted by the Supreme Court as within the Board's discretion. NLRB v. City Dispo-
sal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
88. 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
89. Id.; Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736 (1978), enforced, 614 F.2d 1238 (9th
Cir. 1980).
90. Triangle Tool & Eng'g Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1976).
91. King Soopers, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1011 (1976).
92. Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980). See also
Self-Cycle Marine Distributors Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75 (1978)(unemployment compensa-
tion claim).
93. See C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 141. For a fuller description of the develop-
ment of the "per se" concerted activity doctrine, see Gorman & Finkin, The Individual
and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 286 (1981).
foundation of the Alleluia doctrine, was never supported by the re-
viewing courts,94 the Supreme Court's recent acceptance of the
Board's discretion to interpret section 7 in this manner 95 effectively
overruled the rationale employed by the circuit courts in denying en-
forcement to Board orders based on Alleluia. Similarly, although the
Board itself, following a significant change in its membership, re-
cently overruled Alleluia on the basis of a determination that the
NLRA would not permit such a construction of concerted activity, 96
the D.C. Circuit rejected this rationale and held that the Alleluia
doctrine was a permissible construction of the Act.97 The court
therefore directed the Board to determine whether, as a matter of its
discretion in applying the Act, it would still overturn its Alleluia doc-
trine.98 As of late 1985, no decision by the Board on remand had
been published.
Where all of this leaves the Alleluia doctrine is unclear. However,
even if we assume that, as presently constituted, the Board will prob-
ably reaffirm its abandonment of .the doctrine, the concept of stare
decisis has had little influence on the Board in recent years.99 A
change in the Board's membership could therefore easily revive the
Alleluia doctrine. Moreover, even absent the Alleluia concept of con-
structive concerted activity, there is now little question that, where
there is evidence that an employee was acting at least in part on be-
half of other employees or with their authorization, the employee's
conduct in doing such things as filing safety complaints, discrimina-
tion complaints, and many or most of the other activities states have
94. See, e.g., Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980); Krispy Kreme
Doughnut Corp. v. NLRI, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614
F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., Inc., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1977); NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973); NLRB v.
Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co.,
440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
95. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
96. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984); remanded sub. nom., Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 352 (1985). See also Center
Ridge Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1985).
97. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 352 (1985).
98. Id. at 956-57. The Second Circuit recently reached the same conclusion and
also remanded a case relying on Meyers to the Board for reconsideration. Ewing v.
NLRB, 768 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1985).
99. Perhaps the best example of this tendency can be found in the shifting posi-
tion of the Board on the question of misrepresentations during the period prior to a
representation election. The modern rule in this context, adopted in 1962, had been
that misrepresentations, under specified conditions, could be sufficient to require that
the election result -be disregarded and a new election held. See Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). The Hollywood Ceramics position was overturned in 1978
in Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). A year later, the Board
abandoned Shopping Kart and returned to its position as set out in Hollywood Ceram-
ics. General Knit of California, 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). In 1982, the Board again over-
turned the Hollywood Ceramics/General Knit rule and returned to the Shopping Kart
standard. Midland National Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
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sought to protect against retaliatory discharge by the creation of
"public policy" wrongful discharge torts will be held protected under
section 7.100 As much of this kind of employer retaliation is, by its
nature, of a kind that is directed against employees generally rather
than solely against the specific employee who is discharged,101 there
100. This is the significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). In Eastex, the Court recognized that the Board could prop-
erly hold protected under section 7 employee conduct intended "to improve terms and
conditions of employment or otherwise improve [the employees'] lot as employees
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship." Id. at 565.
See also C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 142-43. In recent years, the Board, with the ap-
proval of the circuit courts, has regularly held this kind of employee activity protected.
See generally id., at 156-58.
101. In the area of complaints of racial discrimination, for example, it has been rec-
ognized that such discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e
(1982), is class discrimination essentially by definition. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). The relief ordered in such cases
commonly includes not only specific relief for the discharged employee, but injunctive
relief against the discriminatory practice that, in the case of the complaining employee,
was effectuated by the discharge. See generally B. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1395-1417 (2d ed. 1983). A similar rationale is obviously available
under the NLRA in the context of safety complaints; to the extent there is a safety or
health hazard, it normally will affect employees generally, not just the particular em-
ployee complaining.
A discharge allegedly in retaliation for an employee's having filed a workers' com-
pensation claim does not so obviously punish an action that, by its nature, is to benefit
all employees. Yet this is the rationale under which the Board, pursuant to the Alle-
luia doctrine, held such employee conduct to be protected concerted activity. See
Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d
304 (4th Cir. 1980). Although the Alleluia doctrine may no longer be accepted by the
Board, see supra note 96 and accompanying text, there exists a substantial rationale to
support the Board's position in Krispy Kreme. Thus, to the extent that the basis of an
employee's claim is that the employer has a policy of discharging employees who file,
workers' compensation claims, his attack on such a policy by a section 8(a)(1) charge to
the Board is necessarily seeking relief against this policy that will benefit all employ-
ees. As all of the employees benefit in concert from such relief, the complaint itself
can be regarded as necessarily an expression of concerted activity, even if unauthor-
ized by, or, indeed, unknown to, any employee other than the current victim of the
policy filing the charge. Conversely, to the extent that the basis of the employee's
claim is not that there exists a policy of discharging employees who file workers' com-
pensation claims, but rather that the employer has unfairly or arbitrarily selected the
employee for discharge when other employees who file workers' compensation claims
are not similarly discharged, the employee's section 8(a)(1) charge would be much
more difficult to defend as an expression of concerted activity protected by section 7.
But at the same time, however, it would also be much less defensible for a state public
policy wrongful discharge action to be applied in this context, as the state interest in
providing a remedy for employees arbitrarily discharged is clearly much less compel-
ling than the interest in providing relief for victims of an employer policy of discharg-
ing all such employees. The effect of this is that, to the extent that the basis of a state
action to rerhedy a discharge allegedly in retaliation for the employee's having filed a
workers' compensation claim is defensible on the basis of a state public policy to pro-
tect the workers' compensation system against employer policies of discharging claim-
will in many cases continue to exist a substantial question whether
the discharged employee's conduct was protected by section 7, and
thus whether the discharge violated section 8(a)(1).
It should also be kept in mind that, as the Supreme Court has re-
cently again noted, even where an individual employee's conduct is
not "concerted activity" and therefore not protected by section 7, an
employer may still violate section 8(a)(1) by the discharge of the em-
ployee where the effect of the discharge is to interfere with or re-
strain other employees' concerted activities. 0 2 It would not be
difficult to construct an argument that the discharge of an employee
for filing safety complaints, reporting or refusing to engage in wrong-
doing, or even filing a workers' compensation claim is an action that,
by its nature, chills both similar conduct by other employees and any
collective efforts to correct the safety problem, halt the wrongdoing,
or protest a policy of punishing by discharge the filing of a workers'
compensation claim.103 Thus, even absent a legal doctrine or a fac-
tual argument that the discharged employee was engaged in "con-
certed activity" protected by section 7, there may still be at least an
arguable basis to contend that the employee's discharge violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1). Since the test under Garmon is whether the activity the
state seeks to regulate is "arguably" prohibited by the NLRA,104 a
more extended analysis of the Garmon exceptions will be required to
determine whether public policy wrongful discharge remedies are
preempted.
In Garmon, the Supreme Court recognized the two basic, and un-
helpfully vague, exceptions to the preemption doctrine that have
formed at least a part of the basis for all of the Court's subsequent
decisions upholding the exercise of state jurisdiction with respect to
activities arguably prohibited by the NLRA. State jurisdiction is not
preempted "where the activity regulated [is] a merely peripheral con-
cern of the [Act .. .or . .. touch[es]] interests so deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling con-
gressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act."' 0 5 In the subsequent application of
these exceptions to specific cases, however, the Court's analysis
strongly suggests that, to the extent that such vague language was
ever intended to constitute actual tests for preemption, it is an intent
now essentially abandoned and the recitation of these standards is
currently little more than make-weight rationalization to support
ants, it is, to the same extent, an action that seeks to provide a remedy for employer
conduct prohibited under section 8(a)(1).
102. NLRB v. City Disposal System, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 833 n.10 (1984).
103. See supra note 101.
104. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
105. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44 (footnotes omitted).
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more specific policy choices by the Court. As the Court's application
of the Garmon exceptions involves a relatively limited number of
cases, a brief survey of its efforts in this context will illustrate the
actual operation of the exceptions.106
Subsequent to Garmon, the Court initially seemed to give the Gar-
mon exceptions a very limited scope.107 In Linn v. United Plant
106. The analytical difficulties in this area have led state courts to "errors" the
Court has never been reticent to expose. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105
S. Ct. 1904, 1912-13 n.9 (1985); Brown v. Hotel Employees Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179,
3186-87 (1984). These "errors" are in many respects largely the fault of the Court it-
self. Thus, the "error" identified in both Brown and Allis-Chalmers, decided in 1984
and 1985 respectively, were almost certainly caused by the Court's identical "error" in
two 1983 cases, Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) and International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983). In both cases, the Court had
described the Garmon exceptions as applicable both to actually and arguably protected
and prohibited conduct.
[S]tate regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they
concern conduct that is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by
the Act. . . . The state regulation or cause of action may, however, be sus-
tained if the behavior to be regulated is behavior that is of only peripheral
concern to the federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling
and responsibility. . . . In such cases, the State's interest in controlling or
remedying the effects of the conduct is balanced against both the interference
with the National Labor Relations Board's ability to adjudicate controversies
committed to it by the Act . . . and the risk that the state will sanction con-
duct that the Act protects.
Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498-99 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Accord, Wisconsin
Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1986);
Jones, 460 U.S. at 676.
When the state courts in Brown and Allis-Chalmers applied the Court's doctrine and
used a balancing test to conduct arguably protected by the Act, however, the Court
distinguished between conduct only arguably protected, to which the balancing test
could be applied, and conduct actually protected, to which the Supremacy Clause oper-
ated directly to preempt state law and thus could not permit the balancing authorized
in Belknap and Jones. Of course, this distinction essentially guts one of the founda-
tions of the Garmon doctrine, which is expressly based on the concept that it is the
NLRB, and not the state or federal courts or, indeed, the Supreme Court, which must
determine in the first instance whether conduct is protected or prohibited under the
NLRA. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. Compare, e.g., Garmon, 359 U.S. at
245 n.4 with Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3187. It is symptomatic of the casuality of the ap-
proach taken by the Court in this area that this critically important change in the
Court's position was either unnoticed by the Court or, if noticed, deemed insufficiently
significant to merit explanation and, ironically, articulated in terms of correcting the
"confusion" of the state courts.
107. See Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-94 (1963).
[I]n the absence of an overriding state interest such as that involved in the
maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must defer to the exclusive com-
petence of the National Labor Relations Board in cases in which the activity
that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protec-
tions of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.
Id. at 693.
Guard Workers of America, Local 114,108 however, the Court signifi-
cantly expanded the reach of the Garmon exceptions.
The lower courts in Linn had held preempted under Garmon an
action based on state libel law growing out of an allegedly libelous
statement made in the context of an organizing campaign on the ra-
tionale that such libel arguably constituted conduct prohibited by sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 109 As recognized subsequently by the
Court, o1 0 the initial basis for the decision by the Court in Linn to re-
verse the lower courts and allow the state action to proceed was the
Court's observation that the NLRB had held unprotected by section 7
defamation accompanied by actual malice."' The unprotected nature
of the malicious libel alleged in Linn seemed to mean that the exer-
cise of state jurisdiction would satisfy the Garmon exception for a
subject that is a "merely peripheral concern" of the Act. In addition,
the state's "overriding state interest" in protecting its citizens from
malicious libel was seen as sufficient to satisfy the "deeply rooted in
local feeling" exception.1 1 2
It is difficult not to read Linn as a repudiation of much of the foun-
dation of Garmon. The whole point of Garmon's preemption of con-
duct only arguably protected or prohibited by the Act was that the
concept of given conduct being arguably protected or prohibited nec-
essarily means that it involves a question that must be resolved to de-
termine whether the conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Board
108. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
109. Id. at 55-56. Linn involves an interesting point not directly considered by the
Court. Prior to filing his state court action, Linn had filed a section 8(b)(1)(A) charge
with the Board alleging that the asserted libel had restrained and coerced employees
in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Id. at 56-57. The Board's Regional Director
had refused to issue a complaint on this charge as he determined that it was factually
unsupported. Id. at 57. Linn then unsuccessfully appealed this decision to the Board's
General Counsel. Thus, despite the fact that the conduct forming the basis of Linn's
state court complaint had already been determined under the Board's pre-adjudicatory
process not to constitute conduct prohibited by the Act, the district court dismissed
Linn's complaint on the basis that the state remedy sought to regulate conduct argua-
bly prohibited by the NLRA. This means that conduct that can be described as argua-
bly prohibited by the Act does not lose this status, and thereby become subject to state
regulation, simply because in a particular case the conduct at issue has been considered
by the Board's Regional Director and General Counsel and determined to be, in fact,
not prohibited. Whether the state plaintiff has made any effort to submit the contro-
versy to the Board and, if so, the Board's disposition of such a charge are thus irrele-
vant factors in applying the Garmon analysis. See also infra note 204. The only
exception to this may be the unusual situation in which the Board's Regional Director
believes the conduct to be prohibited and therefore does issue a complaint, which the
Board's adjudicatory process ultimately determines to be unfounded. In this event,
Garmon recognizes at least the possibility that a state claim challenging the conduct
will not be preempted. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245-46.
110. Jones, 460 U.S. at 681-82 n.11; Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Join-
ers of America Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977).
111. Linn, 383 U.S. at 61.
112. Id. at 61-62.
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and thus beyond the state's power to regulate. Since the Garmon
Court deemed it essential that this question be resolved by the Board,
not by the courts,113 state claims involving even arguably protected
or prohibited conduct were preempted. In Linn, however, the Court
first focused on the alleged libel as being conduct that the Board
would hold protected in the absence of malice and not protected if
malicious. Even though the "arguably protected" branch of Garmon
was not relied on by the lower courts in Linn that had found Linn's
state claims preempted, the Court's analysis should have required a
finding of preemption under the "arguably protected" branch. If the
alleged libel in Linn might or might not have been malicious, then,
as the Court recognized, it might or might not have been protected.
To avoid the possibility that the state court would find the libel mali-
cious and thus not protected and subject to state regulation when the
Board might have reached the opposite conclusion, Garmon estab-
lished that in these circumstances it is the Board, not the courts, that
must determine the character of the libel. The Linn approach aban-
dons this concept sub silento at the very outset.
Moreover, the Court did not do justice to the arguably prohibited
branch of Garmon relied on by the lower courts in finding Linn's
state claims preempted. The fact that the alleged libel would not be
protected if found to be malicious was apparently enough, of itself, to
satisfy the Court that it was conduct of a "merely peripheral con-
cern" of the Act and what was described as the "overwhelming state
interest" in protecting its citizens from malicious libel was seen as
sufficient to satisfy as well the "deeply rooted in local feeling" excep-
tion.114 In the process of expanding on the Garmon exceptions, how-
ever, the Court also discussed a number of factors relevant to
determining their applicability. Such factors included: (1) whether
the state remedy will turn on an inquiry that will not be considered
by the Board in an unfair labor practice proceeding, 1 5 (2) whether
the state forum can provide remedies unavailable from the Board,116
(3) whether allowing the state remedy will interfere with the "effec-
tive administration of national labor policy,"117 and, by inference,
(4) whether allowing the state remedy will cause persons who would
otherwise have utilized the Board's processes, to look instead to state
113. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 242.
114. Linn, 383 U.S. at 61-62.
115. Id. at 63.
116. Id. at 63-64.
117. Id. at 64.
law for a remedy." 8
Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor
Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge19 was accepted by the
Court for the articulated purpose of providing "a fuller explication of
the premises upon which Garmon rests and to consider the extent to
which that decision must be taken to have modified or superseded
this Court's earlier efforts to treat with the knotty pre-emption prob-
lem."120 The case involves not an effort by the state court plaintiff to
fit a state remedy within the Garmon exceptions, but rather a direct
assault on the foundation of Garmon itself. In rejecting this chal-
lenge, the Court seemed to be attempting to both emphasize the ra-
tionale of Garmon and establish rules of sufficient clarity to permit
the lower courts to resolve future preemption problems without the
necessity of extensive further involvement by the Court itself. In the
process, however, as in Linn, the Court added substantial gloss to the
scope of the Garmon exceptions.
Lockridge had allegedly been discharged by his employer at the in-
sistence of his union when he fell one month behind in dues pay-
ments.12 1 Under the circumstances, the union's conduct was held by
the state court to be an implied breach of the union's constitution
and it therefore granted relief under a breach of contract theory,
although it recognized that the union's conduct also violated two pro-
visions of section 8(b) of the NLRA.122
In defense of its refusal to find this application of local law pre-
empted, the state court advanced two rationales of relevance beyond
the immediate facts of Lockridge itself. First, the state court had re-
lied on the fact that the union's conduct was not only an unfair labor
practice, but also a breach of contract under state law. In the view of
the state court, Garmon only required the preemption of state laws
specifically directed to labor relations; the doctrine did not extend to
a state's application of its general law of contracts. 123 Second, the
state court argued that the focus of the state court proceeding-the
interpretation of the contractual rights of Lockridge-would be dif-
ferent from the focus of an unfair labor practice proceeding before
118. Id. at 66.
119. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
120. Id. at 277.
121. Id. at 278-79.
122. Id. at 279, 284. Under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A)
and 158(b)(2) (1982), a union violates the NLRA when it causes an employer to dis-
charge an employee for reasons other than non-membership in the union, where this is
required by the collective agreement and not prohibited by state law. Although the
failure of Lockridge to pay his dues on time deprived him of "good standing" status in
the union, it did not, under the union's rules, result in his loss of membership.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 279-80. The union's conduct in causing the discharge of
Lockridge was therefore held to be conduct prohibited by the Act. 403 U.S. at 284.
123. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 284-85.
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the Board-the alleged discrimination by the union.124
Before its specific rejection of the justifications advanced by the
state court for its refusal to find state law preempted, the Court de-
voted a substantial part of its opinion to the facially appealing argu-
ment that the Court may have perceived to be both the real basis for
the state court's opinion and a probable cause of future resistance to
the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon: if conduct is prohibited
by federal law, why should not the states be free to themselves pro-
hibit, and provide remedies for, the same misconduct? The answer to
this, the Court said, was initially to be found in the intent of Con-
gress to establish not simply the substantive prohibitions set out in
the NLRA, but to ensure as well their uniform administration and
punishment.125 While the Court seemed to recognize that this ration-
ale might be less significant with respect to some prohibited practices
than others, the Court noted its own institutional incapacity to be a
case-by-case referee of the appropriate balance and the resulting ne-
cessity for "a rule capable of relatively easy application, so that lower
courts may largely police themselves in this regard."126 Finally, with
an absence of explanation perhaps predictable in light of its analyti-
cal weakness, the Court also indicated that it felt it would be incon-
sistent to treat conduct prohibited by the NLRA differently for
preemption purposes from conduct protected by the statute. 27 With
these general principles supporting the application of Garmon to con-
duct prohibited by the NLRA, the Court then had little difficulty dis-
posing of the arguments advanced by the state court in support of its
judgment for Lockridge.128
In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
124. Id. at 285.
125. Id. at 285-89.
126. Id. at 290. See also id. at 294-95.
127. Id. at 290.
128. The Court held irrelevant the fact that the state remedy was granted under a
law of general application, a breach of contract action, rather than a state law specifi-
cally directed to labor relations. "It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal de-
scription of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern." Id. at 292.
See also id. at 297 n.7.
The Court also found either irrelevant or. inaccurate the "closely related" conten-
tion that the state proceeding would focus upon a different subject-the interpretation
of the union rules-rather than the focus of proceedings before the Board-the union's
discrimination. Farmer, 403 U.S. at 292. The Court found dispositive the fact that the
effect of the state court's judgment was to regulate the same union conduct, the pro-
curing of Lockridge's discharge, that the Board's proceeding would have regulated. Id.
at 292-93.
America, Local 25,129 the Court considered a factual context similar
in some respects to Lockridge. The court found the state tort action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by the plain-
tiff against his union not preempted 130 despite the fact that the con-
duct of the union in allegedly discriminating against the plaintiff in
hiring hall referrals and other allegedly discriminatory conduct said
to constitute a campaign of personal abuse and harassment at least
arguably appeared to constitute a violation of section 8(b) by the
union. 131 The Court, however, was unwilling to require an "inflexi-
ble application" of Garmon if: (1) the state has a substantial interest
in regulating the conduct, and (2) the state's interest is not one that
threatens "undue" interference with the federal regulatory
scheme.132
Farmer was in large measure a wholesale retreat from the effort in
Lockridge to affirm the sweeping preemption doctrine established in
Garmon. Although the Farmer court again emphasized one of the
primary holdings of both Garmon and Lockridge to the effect that a
state action is not saved from preemption because it applies a law of
general applicability rather than one specifically directed to the regu-
lation of labor relations, 133 in other critical respects much of the ra-
tionale of Lockridge favoring preemption was swept away in what
seemed to be a new exception to Garmon: state claims will not be
preempted if they do not "threaten undue interference" with the fed-
eral scheme. 3 4 The considerations under this new exception seemed
to be: (1) whether the "focus" in the state proceeding will be differ-
ent from the focus in a proceeding before the Board,135 and
(2) whether the state will provide remedies different from those
available from the Board.136 If these criteria are satisfied, Farmer
would apparently make the preemption determination turn on
129. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
130. In addition to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the plain-
tiff had also sought in his complaint damages for breach of contract (based on alleged
violations of both the collective bargaining agreement and the plaintiff's membership
contract with the union) and discrimination in hiring hall referrals. Id. at 293. The
state court held that all of these claims were preempted and no appeal was taken on
these issues to the Supreme Court. Id. at 293 n.3.
131. Id. at 301-02.
132. See id. at 302.
133. See id. at 300.
134. Id. at 302.
135. Id. at 298-99. A virtually identical argument was considered and rejected in
Lockridge. See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 284-85, 292-93. If "[i]t is the conduct being regu-
lated, not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus
of concern," id. at 292, what difference could it make that state courts regulate conduct
in a proceeding with a different "focus" than that which would be found in a proceed-
ing before the Board to regulate the identical conduct?
136. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 298-99. Again, this concept also should be compared to the
Court's specific rejection of the identical argument when presented in Lockridge. See
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 288-89 n.5.
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whether there is only "some risk"137 of, or "a potential" for,13S inter-
ference with the application of the NLRA, in which case the state
claim is not preempted, or whether, instead, there is a "realistic
threat"'139 of such interference, in which case the state claim is pre-
empted.140 This is clearly a retreat from the effort in Lockridge to
establish a usable rule for lower courts to resolve preemption
questions.
The revisionist view of Garmon suggested by Farmer arguably
reached its high water mark in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
District Council of Carpenters.141 The case involved trespassory pick-
eting by non-employees at a large suburban store.142 When the pick-
eters were directed to leave the store's property, they refused to do
so and the store then obtained a state court injunction against the
picketing. 43 Although the picketing was both arguably protected
and arguably prohibited by the NLRA,144 the state court of appeals
upheld the injunction on the rationale that the state's regulation of
the conduct at issue, trespassory picketing, fell within the "deeply
rooted in local feeling" and responsibility exception of Garmon.145
137. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 303.
138. Id. at 304.
139. Id. at 305.
140. The distinctions drawn by the Court predictably led it to a curious conclusion.
The plaintiff in Farmer was allowed to recover for the union's discrimination in hiring
hall referrals (a clear violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act, see id. at
303 n.11) only to the extent that the discrimination was "particularly abusive"; the dis-
crimination itself could not be the basis for recovery. Id. at 305. Thus, ordinary dis-
crimination or, differently expressed, an ordinary violation of section 8(b), could not be
the basis for a state law claim, but an "outrageous" violation of section 8(b) can be the
basis for a state law claim. Id. at 305. To those not having the benefit of the Court's
careful explanation of the basis for its holding in Farmer, it might be thought that it is
precisely the outrageous violations of section 8(b) that Congress would most have de-
sired to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to remedy.
141. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
142. Id. at 182.
143. Id. at 182-83.
144. As the Court's opinion explains, the picketing resulted from the use, by Sears,
of nonunion carpenters. Id. at 182. The picketing might be viewed as a violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(D) if its purpose was to coerce Sears into assigning the carpentry work to
carpenters dispatched by the union hiring hall rather than Sears' own employees. See
id. at 185-86. It might also constitute a violation of section 8(b)(7)(C) if its purpose was
to coerce Sears into signing a prehire or members-only agreement with the union. Id.
at 186. Conversely, if the sole object of the picketing was to secure compliance by
Sears with area standards, it would be protected conduct under section 7. Id. at 186-87.
Thus, both the state supreme court and the United States Supreme Court operated
from the premise that the picketing was both arguably prohibited and arguably pro-
tected by the NLRA. Id. at 184, 187.
145. Id. at 183.
The state supreme court reversed, holding that the trespassory na-
ture of the picketing could not, of itself, deprive it of protection, but
was instead just a factor for the Board to consider in determining
whether the picketing was in fact protected.146
In reversing the state supreme court, the United States Supreme
Court began as it left off in Farmer with reference to the new and
vaguely defined exception to Garmon preemption first articulated in
Farmer: preemption is not required where "the State has a substan-
tial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's in-
terest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the
federal regulatory scheme."147 It then proceeded to substantially di-
lute the two remaining aspects of Lockridge favoring preemption that
Farmer had not already abandoned: the equal preemptive implica-
tions of conduct arguably protected and arguably prohibited 148 and
the lack of a significant distinction for preemption purposes between
state laws of general applicability and those specifically directed to
the regulation of industrial relations.'4 9 However, by far the most
sweeping new policy in Sears for determining the preemption of state
146. Id. at 184.
147. Id. at 188 (quoting Farmer, 430 U.S. at 302).
148. The Lockridge Court concluded that "treating differently judicial power to
deal with conduct protected by the Act from that prohibited by it would ... be unsat-
isfactory." Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 290. The Sears Court concluded that "[w]hile the
considerations underlying ... [the arguably protected and arguably prohibited
branches of Garmon] overlap, they differ in significant respects and therefore it is use-
ful to review them seperately." Sears, 436 U.S. at 190. As set out in the text, the Court
in Sears then constructed what amounts to an analytically distinct set of preemption
criteria for state efforts to regulate arguably prohibited and arguably protected
conduct.
149. The Lockridge Court had summarily rejected the argument that a distinction
should exist for preemption purposes between laws of general applicability and those
specifically directed to industrial relations.
Pre-emption, as shown above, is designed to shield the system from conflicting
regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal de-
scription of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern. In-
deed, the notion that a relevant distinction exists for such purposes between
particularized and generalized labor law was explicitly rejected in Garmon
itself.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292. As indicated by the quote, the Garmon Court had reached
the same conclusion. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
In Sears, however, the absence of a distinction between state labor laws and state
laws of general applicability was overturned. Although the preemption rationale was
seen to have "its greatest force" when applied to state labor laws, it "may also apply to
certain laws of general applicability which are occassionally invoked in connection
with a labor dispute." Sears, 436 U.S. at 193 (footnote omitted). While the general ap-
plicability of a state law is not "sufficient" to exempt it from preemption, id. at 193
n.22 (emphasis in original) (quoting Farmer, 430 U.S. at 300), the Court in Sears was
clearly willing to consider it a relevant factor.
While the distinction between a law of general applicability and a law ex-
pressly governing labor relations is, as we have noted, not dispositive for pre-
emption purposes, it is of course apparent that the latter is more likely to in-
volve the accomodation which Congress reserved to the Board. It is also evi-
dent that enforcement of a law of general applicability is less likely to
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laws regulating arguably prohibited conduct was the Court's formula-
tion of how it should be determined whether the Farmer significant
state interest-little risk of interference exception should be applied.
Under Sears, the "critical inquiry" in this context is "whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . or differ-
ent from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to
the Labor Board."150
In Sears, the Court viewed the issue that would have been consid-
ered by the Board to have been the purpose of the picketing, and the
issue considered by the state court to involve only its location. Thus,
the rationale supporting preemption of state regulation of arguably
prohibited conduct was seen by the Court as inapplicable and as such
insufficient to require preemption.'15
The "identical controversy" test established in Sears has been
widely discussed.152 Conversely, one of the most remarkable features
of Sears, and one with significant potential impact in applying the
preemption doctrine to wrongful discharge claims has, in comparison,
gone almost unnoticed. In beginning its discussion of the arguably
protected branch of Garmon, the Court in Sears remarked in passing
that "[a]part from notions of 'primary jurisdiction,' there would be no
objection to state courts' and the NLRB's exercising concurrent juris-
diction over conduct prohibited by the federal Act. But there is a
constitutional objection to state-court interference with conduct actu-
ally protected by the Act."'153 The implication that the supremacy
clause 15 4 does not govern the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon
is little short of incomprehensible. As recognized in Lockridge, Gar-
mon established "constitutional principles of preemption. 155 The
Court itself noted in Sears that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
as that term is normally employed, is simply a guide to courts in de-
termining when it should stay judicial proceedings so that an admin-
istrative agency can consider the question presented by the suit.1 56
generate rules or remedies which conflict with federal labor policy than the
invocation of a special remedy under a state labor relations law.
Id. at 197-98 n.27. See also id. at 194-95 n.24 (explaining that Lockridge had held only
that state regulation of arguably prohibited conduct cannot avoid preemption "simply
because it is pursuant to a law of general application").
150. Id. at 197.
151. Id. at 198.
152. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 67, at 211 n.61.
153. Sears, 436 U.S. at 199 (footnotes omitted).
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
155. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
156. Sears, 436 U.S. at 199 n.29 (quotation omitted).
Nothing in this doctrine could possibly give the Supreme Court the
authority to overturn state court decisions. It is the supremacy
clause, and only the supremacy clause, that provides that authority in
the context of Garmon preemption.157
Nor does the Court in Sears simply assume a supervisory authority
over state courts that the Court does not possess. At its core, this
concept rejects, in the context of the arguably prohibited branch of
Garmon, the entire foundation of this part of the Garmon doctrine as
analyzed in Lockridge. States are not precluded from prohibiting
conduct that the NLRA prohibits simply to be tactful to the National
Labor Relations Board. As the Court in Lockridge took pains to em-
phasize,1Ss there are substantive limits to the prohibitions of the
NLRA. If, for example, the statute would not allow the Board to re-
quire that a union pay damages for picketing in violation of section
8(b)(4),159 Lockridge recognized that this is, itself, a form of "protec-
tion" for such conduct.160 Absent the availability of one of the Gar-
mon exceptions, which are predicated at least ostensibly on
congressional intent and thus properly are a part of a supremacy
clause analysis, Lockridge and Garmon deny to the states by opera-
tion of that clause any power to deprive those covered by the statute
of this "protection." To read Garmon, as did the Court in Sears, as
authority for the Court's possession of general supervisory authority
to permit the state courts to regulate conduct with respect to which
Congress has already established the limits of regulation, either spe-
cifically in the statute or by its delegation of authority to the Board,
is the equivalent of establishing not an exception to Garmon but to
the supremacy clause itself.
After Sears, decided in 1978, it would have been reasonable to con-
clude that the Garmon/Lockridge formulation of the preemption test
for arguably prohibited conduct had been effectively replaced. 161 So
long as the state could articulate a "significant state interest in pro-
tecting the citizen from the challenged conduct" and the controversy
157. In contrast to its general supervisory authority over lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court possesses no similar authority to oversee the conduct and decisions of
state courts. See, e.g., Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344 (1981).
158. See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 285-91. See also Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor
and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1059-63 (1986).
159. See C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 1690.
160. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 287 ("The technique of administration and the range
and nature of those remedies that are and are not available is a fundamental part and
parcel of the operative legal system established by the National Labor Relations
Act.").
161. Sears had almost as great an impact on the arguably protected branch of Gar-
mon. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 67, at 220-23. This is not discussed here since, as pre-
viously indicated, a state "public policy" remedy for wrongful discharge must be
analyzed as an effort to regulate arguably prohibited conduct: the employer's arguable
violation of section 8(a)(1). See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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to be presented to the state court is not "identical" to that which
would be presented to the Board, state regulation seemingly was not
preempted.162 Five years later, in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,16a the Sears
analysis was to a large extent ostensibly reaffirmed. The emphasis,
however, had begun by this point to change yet again in the direction
of the original Garmon rationale.
Belknap involved an employer that had made offers of permanent
employment to strike replacements during the course of what was ar-
guably an unfair labor practice strike.164 After the replacements had
been hired by means of inducements that they would not be dis-
charged at the conclusion of the strike, however, the employer
agreed to a settlement of the strike under which the strike replace-
ments would eventually be replaced by the returning strikers.165 In
return for the employer's settlement of the strike, the Board's Re-
gional Director dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint that
had been issued against the employer 166 and, because of this, there
was never an actual determination whether the strike had been in
fact an unfair labor practice strike.
After the strike replacements had been laid off to permit the re-
turn of the strikers pursuant to the strike settlement, the laid off
replacements sued in state court alleging both misrepresentation and
breach of contract.167 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the employer, holding both claims preempted, but was re-
versed by the state appellate court, which held that the employer's
conduct was not prohibited by the NLRA and that, in all events, the
misrepresentation and breach of contract claims satisfied the "periph-
eral concern" and "deeply rooted in local law" exceptions to
Garmon.168
Only a part of the Court's analysis in Belknap is relevant to the ar-
162. Sears, 436 U.S. at 196-97.
163. 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
164. Id. at 493-96. During the course of an economic strike (i.e. a strike to coerce
the employer to agree to the union's negotiating demands), an employer may lawfully
hire permanent replacements for the strikers. See id. at 500. During an unfair labor
practice strike (i.e. a strike initiated or prolonged by the employer's unfair labor prac-
tice), however, even a promise of permanent employment to strike replacements is a
violation of the Act and, in all events, the strikers must be returned to their jobs after
the strike even if this requires, as it normally does, the discharge or layoff of the strike
replacements. See id. at 507-08.
165. Id. at 496.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 496-97.
168. Id. at 497-98.
guably prohibited branch of Garmon.169 With respect to the preemp-
tion of the misrepresentation claim, the Court appeared to agree that
the misrepresentations to the putative replacements that they were
being hired as permanent employees who would not be laid off at the
conclusion of the strike arguably constituted conduct prohibited by
section 8(a)(1) of the Act.170 The Court reasoned, however, that both
the Garmon "peripheral concern / deeply rooted in local law" and
the Sears "identical controversy" exceptions were applicable since
the "focus" of any unfair labor practice proceeding would have been
on the rights of the strikers while the state action concerned only the
rights of the replacements.171 As the strikers could obtain no relief
in state court, and the replacements could obtain no relief from the
Board, there was no effort to provide an "alternative forum" to the
NLRB and there was the prospect of denying any remedy at all to
the replacements if their state claims were preempted.172 The Court
thus concluded that the state action "would not interfere" with the
Board's jurisdiction, that it was "no more than [a] pheripheral con-
cern" of the NLRB, that the state had a "substantial interest" in pro-
viding relief, and that the state interests therefore "outweigh any
possible interference with the Board's function." 173
Although, as set out above, the Court's decision in Belknap recites
almost by rote the familiar and largely unhelpful catch phrases from
prior cases, the principal contribution of the case to the development
of the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon is probably best seen as
an illustration of the scope of the Sears "identical controversy" ex-
ception. After Belknap, it seemed clear that, essentially by defini-
tion, a state claim involving arguably prohibited conduct would not
169. The Court considered whether the state claims should be preempted under the
separate preemption doctrine based on Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 427 U.S. 132 (1976). See Belknap, 463 U.S. at
499-507. This is discussed seperately below. See infra notes 294-298 and accompanying
text. The Court's analysis of the preemption of the breach of contract claim is also not
relevant to the focus of the present examination. That issue essentially involved a
claim by the employer that its discharge of the "permanent" replacements was in a
sense "protected" activity since the discharge would have been required by the Board
if the strike had been held to be an unfair labor practice strike. See Belknap, 463 U.S.
at 508, 511-12.
170. Id. at 507-10. This is not entirely clear, however, since there are two levels of
conjecture involved. As summarized by the Court, if the unfair labor practices could
have been sustained, then the offers of permanent employment would arguably have
been violations since they could be viewed as threats to refuse to reinstate what might
have been unfair labor practice strikers. Id. As the Court seems to have accepted as a
beginning premise that the mispresentations were arguably prohibited, however, this
uncertainty can be disregarded for present purposes.
171. Id. at 510-11.
172, Id. at 510. This concern for denying a remedy to claimants felt by the Court to
be deserving of one was also an important factor in the "arguably protected" analysis
in Sears. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 199-208.
173. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 510-11.
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constitute an identical controversy to a Board proceeding challenging
the same conduct if the focus of the state proceeding would be upon
the rights of persons other than those whose rights would be deter-
mined by the Board in the unfair labor practice proceeding. This is
clearly of little help in applying the preemption doctrine to wrongful
discharge cases. 174 There are, however, two other suggestions that
may be drawn from Belknap that may be of relevance to such claims.
One of the justifications offered by the Court to support its finding
that the misrepresentation claim in Belknap was not preempted was
that the state court would not offer the state plaintiffs "an alterna-
tive forum for obtaining relief that the Board can provide." 175 It is
not entirely clear, however, what the Court's point was in advancing
this as a justification for finding no preemption. If the Court meant
to suggest that the need to avoid encouraging potential claimants
before the Board to opt instead for a state forum176 was a factor that,
if present, would argue in favor of preemption, then Belknap might
provide at least partial support for the preemption of state public pol-
icy wrongful discharge actions. On the other hand, if the Court
meant to suggest that the availability of remedies in the state forum
that are unavailable from the Board in a particular class of cases is a
174. In the public policy wrongful discharge action, the focus of the same claim
brought as a section 8(a)(1) charge before the Board would be upon the violation of the
federally protected right to engage in concerted activity of the employee who has been
discharged. In the most immediate sense, wrongful discharge actions also focus upon
the employee's rights. Nevertheless, an argument can be made that such state actions
exist not to protect the rights of individual employees, but to protect the state's inter-
est in such things as its workers' compensation system, the safety and health of its citi-
zens, and the reporting of wrongdoing. The difficulty with this argument would be
that, in somewhat the same sense, the NLRA exists to enforce not just individual em-
ployee rights, but also the national interest in domestic labor peace. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1982). It is therefore doubtful that this aspect of Belknap could save wrongful
discharge claims from preemption.
Similarly, however, Belknap cannot be read as authority for the converse proposition
that, where the focus of the state and Board proceedings will be upon the rights of the
same individual, the state claims will necessarily be preempted. Farmer and, to a more
limited extent, Sears both involved factual situations in which no preemption was
found despite the fact that any proceeding before the Board would have focused upon
the rights of the same individuals as the state proceeding. Both cases were relied on by
the Court in Belknap.
175. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 510.
176. This is an issue raised, but not resolved, in Linn, 383 U.S. at 66-67. There, the
Court considered a similar argument and determined that, under the facts of Linn, al-
lowing the state claim would not have the effect of discouraging the use of the Board's
processes. Id. This determination precluded any indication of what effect, if any, it
would have in the preemption analysis if the availability of the state remedy was to be
seen as diverting potential claimants before the Board to the state courts.
factor militating against preemption, then the case could support an
argument that state public policy wrongful discharge claims are not
preempted.177
There is also an implicit thematic message in Belknap of potential
relevance to the question of preemption of wrongful discharge
claims. Both Garmon and Lockridge relied heavily in formulating
the preemption doctrine on the intent of Congress in enacting the
NLRA.178 At least facially, the congressional intent also formed the
basis for the Court's decisions in Linn,179 Farmer,8 0 and Sears.181 In
Belknap, however, there is little reference to congressional intent
and none at all in the context of the Court's discussion of the Gar-
mon doctrine. Indeed, little more than lip service seems to be paid to
even the Court's own prior opinions. In the end, the real basis for the
opinion seems nothing more nor less than the majority's subjective
conclusion that "[tihe state interests involved in this case clearly out-
weigh any possible interference with the Board's function." 18 2 As in
Farmer and Sears, this kind of approach means that the policy of
Lockridge to establish a rule of preemption has been abandoned for
exactly the case-by-case approach that case rejected.18 3 This natu-
rally makes more difficult any prediction of the Court's approach to
the preemption of state public policy wrongful discharge claims.1 8 4
177. The remedies available from the Board in a section 8(a)(1) proceeding include
reinstatement and back pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). The Board cannot, however,
award punitive damages. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Rela-
tions v. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 n.5 (1986) (stating that the Board is generally
not authorized to impose punitive penalties); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961). By contrast, many of the state public policy wrongful
discharge actions have awarded substantial punitive damages. See generally Mallor,
Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 449 (1985).
178. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 239-44; Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 286-91.
179. Linn, 383 U.S. at 58-59.
180. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 295-98.
181. Sears, 436 U.S. at 190-93.
182. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 289-90.
183. See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 289-90.
Nor can we proceed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether each partic-
ular final judicial pronouncement does, or might reasonably be thought to,
conflict in some relevant manner with federal labor policy. This Court is ill-
equipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates that this problem
be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy application, so that lower
courts may largely police themselves in this regard.
Id.
184. For example, in a case decided the following year, Brown v. Hotel Employees
Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984), involving what would have been the arguably protected
branch of Garmon, it is possible that the Court abandoned the Garmon framework en-
tirely for at least this branch of Garmon. In Brown, the Court initially distinguished
conduct that is arguably protected from that which is actually protected. In the for-
mer category, a "presumption" of preemption was said to apply that can be overcome
when "unusually 'deeply rooted' local interests are at stake." Id. at 3186-87. In the lat-
ter category, no exceptions apply; with respect to conduct actually protected by the
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Less than three months before Justice White handed down the
Court's opinion in Belknap, he handed down yet another opinion for
the Court applying Garmon that went unnoticed either by him or the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Belknap: Local 926, Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones.185 To a significant ex-
tent, however, Jones answers questions left open by Belknap and
confirms the retreat suggested by Belknap from the restrictive Sears
approach to preemption.
Jones is a useful case for present purposes both because it is among
the most recent applications by the Court of the arguably prohibited
branch of Garmon and because it involves a context very similar to
that presented by a wrongful discharge claim. The facts in this case
are therefore significant for our purposes.
Jones had been hired as a supervisor and was discharged on his
third day of employment as the alleged result of the union's having
"procured" his discharge in retaliation for Jones' decision to accept
employment years previously by a nonunion employer. 8 6 Jones filed
an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the
union had coerced his employer in its selection of supervisors and
bargaining representatives in violation of sections 8(b)(1)(A)187 and
Act, "'[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material .... . - Id.
at 3187 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)). The Court then determined,
however, that the challenged state law in Brown "does not actually conflict with § 7
and so is not preempted by the NLRA." Brown, 104 S. Ct. at 3190. In light of the
Court's approach, it can be questioned whether anything remains of the Garmon
framework, at least with respect to its "arguably protected" branch. If, as in Brown,
the analysis as actually applied now requires the Supreme Court (and, by inference,
the lower federal and state courts) to determine whether conduct is or is not actually
protected with the preemption of the state law turning on the answer, what is left of
the "arguably protected" concept? If the court determines that the conduct is actually
protected, the state law is preempted forthwith without regard to balancing the local
and federal interests. Id. at 3187. If the court determines that it is not actually pro-
tected, this also ends the inquiry: the regulation "does not actually conflict with § 7
and so is not preempted. ... Id. at 3190. Notwithstanding the Court's reformulated
articulation of the Garmon test as a "presumption" of preemption for arguably pro-
tected conduct, it is difficult to see how in this framework such a presumption could
operate and, thus, what further purpose would be served by describing conduct as "ar-
guably protected." If the same analysis were to be applied to the "arguably prohibited"
branch of Garmon, it would make yet more difficult any attempt to predict whether
public policy wrongful discharge claims are preempted.
185. 460 U.S. 669 (1983). Jones was also ignored by a number of commentators at-
tempting to analyze Belknap. See, e.g., Note, Labor Law Preemption After Belknap v.
Hale: Has Preemption as Usual Been Permanently Replaced?, 17 IND. L. REV. 491
(1984); Note, The National Labor Relations Act Does Not Preempt a Discharged Perma-
nent Replacement Worker's State Cause of Action, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1984).
186. Jones, 460 U.S. at 671-72.
187. Id. at 672. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), prohibits a union from
8(b)(1)(B).188 After the Board's Regional Director had dismissed his
charge as being factually unsupported, Jones elected not to appeal
the dismissal to the Board's General Counsel and, instead, filed suit
in state court against, inter alia,189 the union, asserting that the
union had interfered with his contractual relations with his em-
ployer-a tort under state law.19 0 The trial court dismissed the claim
as preempted but was reversed by the state appellate court, which
held that the state claim was not preempted both because of the
state's asserted "deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens'
contractual rights and because the action, which sounded in tort, was
so unrelated to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would
not interfere with the administration of those laws."191
The Court's analysis in Jones begins by summarizing what it de-
scribes as "a variant of a familiar theme" that has "been stated and
restated."192 First, it must be determined "whether the conduct that
the State seeks to regulate or to make the basis of liability is actually
or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA."'19 3 If so, the state
law and procedures are preempted, unless one of the Garmon excep-
tions related to conduct that is either only a peripheral concern of
the Act or is deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility is appli-
cable.194 The "deeply rooted" exception is to be governed by a "sensi-
restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of section 7 rights. It is in many re-
spects similar to section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), prohibiting employer restraint or
interference with employees' section 7 rights. As previously set out, the "arguably pro-
hibited" branch of Garmon is relevant to an analysis of the possible preemption of
public policy wrongful discharge actions because of the possibility that such a dis-
charge might arguably constitute a violation of section 8(a)(1). See supra note 80 and
accompanying text. Jones is therefore of particular relevance to the analysis, since the
Court's approach to preemption under section 8(b)(1)(A) of Jones' state claim alleging
that the union had wrongfully brought about his discharge is in many respects analo-
gous to the analysis under section 8(a)(1) of a claim by an employee that his employer
has wrongfully discharged him.
Jones, in fact, came very close to preempting much of this article. A second count of
Jones' complaint had sought relief against his employer on the basis of an allegation
that the employer had breached its employment contract with him. Id. at 674. The
state trial court had also held this claim preempted and the state appellate court af-
firmed the dismissal of this part of Jones' complaint without reaching the preemption
question on the ground that, as an employee at will, Jones could not obtain relief for
his discharge from his employer in any event. 159 Ga. App. 693, 695, 285 S.E.2d 30, 31
(1981). Jones did not seek to appeal this determination. Jones, 460 U.S. at 674 n.6.
188. Jones, 460 U.S. at 672. Under section 8(b)(1)(B), unions are prohibited from
restraining or coercing employers in the selection of the employer's representatives for
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment. Id.
189. See supra note 187.
190. Jones, 460 U.S. at 673-74.
191. Id. at 674-75.
192. Id. at 675-76 (quoting Garnon, 359 U.S. at 239). In light of the history of the
Court's efforts in this area as summarized above, the impatience suggested by the opin-
ion cannot escape irony.
193. Jones, 460 U.S. at 676.
194. Id.
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tive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by
Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdic-
tion or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance
of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its
citizens."195
Based on a very similar preemption case decided 20 years previ-
ously,1 96 the Court applied the Garmon analysis to find initially that
the union's conduct forming the basis for Jones' state law claim was
an arguable violation of both section 8(b)(1)(A) and section
8(b)(1)(B). 197 In reaching this determination, the Court clarified by
its analysis one of the previously unexplained ambiguities of the Gar-
mon doctrine.
The Court had not previously explained clearly just what "argua-
bly prohibited" means. It had been unclear whether the Court had
intended to refer to an arguable legal basis or an arguable factual ba-
sis, or both, which, if accepted by the Board, would make out a viola-
tion of section 8. "Arguably prohibited" might mean that there is an
arguable basis to contend that, on a given set of facts, the Board
would conclude as a legal matter that a violation had been made out.
It might also mean that there is an arguable basis to contend that the
Board might find certain facts to be true, in which case a violation
would be found. The answer to this ambiguity given in Jones is that
either basis will suffice to satisfy the "arguably prohibited" test.
Thus, with respect to the contention that the union's conduct was ar-
guably prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that an
existing doctrine under which a violation of this provision could be
established was "arguably applicable to this case."19 8 This is plainly
"arguably prohibited" on the basis of an arguable construction of law.
With respect to the contention that the union's conduct was arguably
prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(B), the Court saw the question of a vio-
lation turning on whether Jones would have had collective bargain-
ing responsibilities in his job.' 99 Since the Court found it at least
arguable that he would have had such responsibilities, there was also
an arguable violation of section 8(b)(1)(B).200 This is clearly "argua-
bly prohibited" on the basis of an arguable factual contention.
195. Id.
196. Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963).
197. Jones, 460 U.S. at 677-78.
198. Id. at 678-79.
199. Id. at 679.
200. Id. at 680.
Having found that the union's conduct was arguably prohibited, the
Court proceeded to consider and reject the state court's justifications
for refusing to find Jones' claim preempted. The contention that
Jones' unsuccessful attempt to pursue a charge before the Board
"satisfied all of the interests of the federal law and cleared the way
for a state cause of action"201 was summarily dismissed. The Court
observed, first, that Jones failed to attempt an appeal from the Re-
gional Director's dismissal of his charge as factually unsupported and
therefore had failed to satisfy "ordinary primary-jurisdiction require-
ments." 202 Second, the Court noted that, even had Jones pursued un-
successfully to exhaustion all of his remedies before the Board, this
could not save his state claim from preemption.
[Jones did not take] adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in
one administrative agency nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies
within the Act's purview. Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This implements the
congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of
the national labor policy.
2 0 3
Thus, an incomplete attempt, a completed attempt, and, a fortiomi, no
attempt at all to obtain a remedy from the Board are all irrelevant to
the question of preemption.204
The Court then continued to consider Jones' argument, relying on
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 681 (emphasis in original).
204. This conclusion is forced under the Court's analysis. However, Jones, in com-
mon with many of the Court's other labor preemption decisions, suggests that tradi-
tional analysis plays, at best, a minor and poorly articulated role in the Court's
decisions. Having expressly rejected Jones' efforts to pursue a charge before the Board
as a basis under which the preemption of his state claim could be avoided, the Court
then proceeded to rely on that same fact as a justification for finding preemption. Be-
cause the Board's Regional Director had found Jones' charge that the union had
caused his discharge to be factually unsupported, the Court was able to describe his
state court suit as an effort "to relitigate the question in the state courts." Id. at 683.
This was seen to support the finding of preemption. "The risk of interference with the
Board's jurisdiction is thus obvious and substantial." Id. The Court's approach sug-
gests a kind of Garmon "Catch 22." A state court plaintiff with a claim involving ar-
guably prohibited conduct is preempted from the outset if he has failed to first avail
himself of an available Board remedy because this is necessary to protect "ordinary
primary-jurisdiction requirements." Id. But if he does first pursue a charge before the
Board and thus satisfies these requirements, the Board's rejection of the factual basis
for the charge will mean that a subsequent effort to litigate the claim in state court
will constitute an effort to "relitigate the question" and thus create an "obvious and
substantial" risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction. Perhaps worse, this
kind of analysis is misleading to the extent that it suggests that a potential state court
plaintiff can avoid preemption by first pursuing to exhaustion his remedy before the
Board (thereby satisfying the "ordinary primary-jurisdiction requirements") and pre-
vailing (thereby avoiding any risk that a successful subsequent suit in state court
would involve relitigating the determination made by the Board). Of course, if the
Court's decision in Jones could be read in this fashion, it would have effectively con-
verted a doctrine of preemption into a doctrine of primary jurisdiction as that term is
commonly used in administrative law - a concept rejected by the Court in even its most
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Sears, that his state cause of action should not be preempted as it was
not identical to a proceeding before the Board since a Board proceed-
ing would focus on whether the union had coercively caused his dis-
charge while the state suit could provide relief even if the union
noncoercively caused the discharge.20 5 The Court rejected this argu-
ment because of (1) the Court's conclusion that Jones' characteriza-
tion of his state suit was inaccurate, 206 (2) the argument would
require the state court to determine in the first instance whether the
union's conduct was coercive-a question the Court concluded should
be resolved by the Board,20 7 and (3) the state court and Board pro-
ceedings would be "identical" as "a fundamental part" of the state
claim was the union's causation of Jones' discharge, "the same crucial
element" that must be proved to establish the violation of section
8(b)(1)(B).208 Apparently based on the last point, the Court was able
to conclude that Jones could satisfy neither the "peripheral concern"
nor the "deeply rooted in local law" exceptions to Garmon and that
his state claim was therefore not saved from preemption.2 0 9
Jones' final effort consisted of an argument that his state claim
should not be preempted as it offered him the opportunity to recover
punitive damages and attorneys fees while a proceeding before the
restrictive interpretation of the scope of Garmon preemption. See Sears, 436 U.S. at
199 n.29.
The answer to all of this is that the Court was right the first time in Jones. As
stated at the outset of this part of the Jones analysis, "[m]atters within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide." Jones, 460
U.S. at 681. If a state court plaintiff has failed to pursue, or to exhaust, his Board rem-
edy, there is an additional reason for preemption by virtue of the primary jurisdiction
requirements. Similarly, if he has obtained a determination from the Board at any
stage of its proceedings that his claim is factually unsupported, this is, again, an addi-
tional reason for preemption by virtue of the need to avoid relitigation of the question
by a state court and the resulting interference with the Board's jurisdiction. In the ab-
sence of either or both of these aggravating circumstances, however, the original basis
for the Garmon doctrine still requires preemption.
205. Jones, 460 U.S. at 681-83.
206. Id. at 682. The Court interpreted the argument as conceding that a state court
suit for coercive interference with contractual relations would be preempted and con-
cluded that Jones' state court complaint alleged such coercive interference so that he
"thus sought to prove a coerced discharge and breach of contract, the very claim that is
concededly preempted." Id. But see id. at 686 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that the Court had both incorrectly interpreted Jones' argument as a concession
and misinterpreted his state court complaint).
207. Id. at 682.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 683. The Court also concluded, perhaps gratuitiously in light of its deter-
mination on the "arguably prohibited" branch of Garmon, that Jones' state court claim
would also be preempted under the "arguably protected" branch. Id. at 683-84.
Board could only result in his receipt of back pay. Although the
Court's application of Garmon in the past provided substantial sup-
port for such an argument,2 10 it was summarily rejected by the
Court's reference to the fact that an identical effort to avoid preemp-
tion was considered and rejected in Garmon itself.211
The Court's most recent opportunity to apply the arguably prohib-
ited branch of Garmon prompted a unanimous Court to return to the
sweeping preemption language of Garmon and Lockridge. In Wis-
consin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc.,212
the Court considered whether the NLRA preempts a state statute
that established a debarment scheme under which repeat violators of
the NLRA were precluded from doing business with the state.2 13 In
finding that the state statute was preempted under Garmon, the
Court focused directly on the central issue raised by a state's effort to
provide an alternative remedy by means of a public policy wrongful
discharge action for employees discharged in violation of section
8(a)(1).
[T]he general rule set forth in ... [Garmon is] ... that states may not regulate
activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.
Because 'conflict is imminent' whenever 'two remedies are brought to bear on
the same activity,' . . . the Garmon rule prevents states . . . from providing
their own regulatory or judicial remedies for conduct prohibited or arguably
prohibited by the Act.
2 1 4
Such unqualified language in a very recent and unanimous decision
by the Court would seem to have obvious implications with respect to
the possible preemption of state law public policy wrongful discharge
actions, which are clearly efforts to provide alternative remedies for
conduct at least arguably prohibited by the NLRA.215 Gould may not
be as dispositive as its language might suggest, however. As noted by
the Court, the statute in Gould had as its direct purpose and effect
the enforcement of the NLRA216 rather than the protection of the
state's citizens from conduct that only coincidentally also violated the
statute. In addition, the conduct punished by the state action in
Gould, multiple proven violations of the NLRA, constitutes by defini-
tion conduct actually, not arguably, prohibited the NLRA. The Court
210. See, e.g., Linn, 383 U.S. at 63-64; Farmer, 430 U.S. at 298-99. See also the dis-
cussion on this point as presented in Belknap, supra notes 173-77 and accompanying
text.
211. Jones, 460 U.S. at 684.
212. 106 S. Ct. 1057 (1986).
213. Id. at 1059. Under the statute, Wis. STAT. § 101.245 (Supp. 1985), persons or
firms found by judicially enforced orders of the NLRB to have violated the NLRA in
three separate cases within a five year period were debarred for three years. Id. at
1059-60.
214. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. at 1061.
215. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
216. Gould Inc., 106 S. Ct. at 1061-62.
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has in the past utilized distinctions far less compelling than these to
avoid the effect of language equally as sweeping as that in Gould.
Gould completes the Supreme Court cases applying the Garmon
doctrine's "arguably prohibited" branch. As suggested by the wide
swings in the Court's approach from an expansive scope of preemp-
tion (Garmon), to a more restricted scope (Linn), back again to the
original expansive scope of Garmon (Lockridge), back again to an ex-
tremely restricted scope (Farmer and Sears), and finally returning
yet again to a more expansive scope (Belknap, Jones, and Gould), the
task of applying the Garmon doctrine to the developing law of state
public policy wrongful discharge actions is far from simple. At the
outset, any such effort is substantially inhibited by the fact that the
possibility of preemption of wrongful discharge claims in the nonun-
ion context seems to have been generally ignored in case law outside
of the limited context of claims involving a discharge allegedly
caused by the employee's efforts to organize union conduct that is not
arguably but clearly prohibited by the Act.217 Even in a unionized
setting, such preemption case analysis normally relates solely to the
implications of the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
containing its own restriction on the employer's right to discharge.
This is a separate preemption doctrine. 218 With rare exceptions, 21 9
the implications of the Allelulia doctrine220 to preemption under
Garmon seem simply not to have occurred either to the litigants or
the courts.221
Beyond this problem, the history of the Court's development of the
Garmon doctrine proves, if nothing else, that analysis based on cases
dealing with other contexts means little in terms of predicting the
probable disposition of future cases. Indeed, the Court had contra-
dicted itself in this area so much that it is debatable whether any
principles actually exist to form a predictable basis for the applica-
tion of the preemption doctrine. The progeny of Garmon are replete
with examples of concepts and criteria prominently relied on in one
217. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
218. See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Flick v. General Host Corp., 573 F. Supp. 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(holding
a state claim alleging discharge in retaliation for a workers' compensation claim was
not preempted).
220. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
221. Similarly, even post Alleluia commentators have, as a group, either ignored
this issue or elected not to explore it even when specifically considering the possibility
of preemption of wrongful discharge claims. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 15, at 530-
31; NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 643 n.43. One commentator has addressed this
question, however. See State Actions, supra note 15, at 957-68.
case, ignored or abandoned in the next, and subsequently redis-
covered. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, like obscenity, the
need in any case for preemption under Garmon is something that the
Justices know when they see it, but cannot define in terms of deduc-
tive principles to which they subsequently adhere. However, on the
demonstrably naive assumption that the Court will, in this instance,
adhere to principles derived from its prior decisions, a very good case
can be made that essentially all state public policy wrongful dis-
charge actions are preempted under Garmon.
As "stated and restated" by the Court, the Garmon analysis begins
with an initial determination of whether the conduct sought to be
regulated by the state is arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA.222 If Garmon is applicable at all in this context, it is because,
in seeking to provide a remedy for the discharge of employees in re-
taliation for conduct the state wishes to protect or foster, the state is
regulating conduct-the discharge-that is arguably prohibited by
section 8(a)(1) of the Act: restraint, by discharge, of the exercise of
the employees' section 7 right to engage in concerted activity for mu-
tual aid or protection.223 So long as the Board adhered to the Alle-
luia doctrine, under which an employee's individual conduct of the
type sought to be protected by the state remedies was held to con-
structive or per se "concerted" activity,224 there was little question
that, in virtually all cases, the state remedy would necessarily have
involved at least arguably prohibited conduct and thus satisfied the
initial preemption inquiry.225 Although the Board has recently
sought to abandon the Alleluia doctrine on the basis that its concept
of constructive concerted activity is not a permissible interpretation
of the Act,226 the Supreme Court still more recently substantially un-
dercut the basis for the Board's abandonment of Alleluia227 and two
circuit courts have refused to accept Board decisions that were based
on its abandonment of Alleluia.228 Under these circumstances, there
continues to exist at least an arguable basis to contend that state pub-
lic policy wrongful discharge actions seek to regulate conduct prohib-
ited by the Act. Under Garmon, no more than this is required to
satisfy the initial test for preemption.
Moreover, even if the Board adheres to its current policy and is ul-
timately sustained by the courts, this by no means ends the possibil-
222. Jones, 460 U.S. at 676.
223. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
225. See also NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 643 n.43; State Actions, supra
note 15, at 957-60.
226. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
227. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
228. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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ity of Garmon preemption for many of the state public policy
wrongful discharge actions. The Alleluia doctrine simply eliminated
the need for any specific showing in a section 8(a)(1) action of actual
concerted activity; the nature of the employee's conduct was deemed
sufficient to establish at least a presumption of concerted activity.
But even without the Alleluia presumption, it will still be a violation
of section 8(a)(1) for an employer to discharge an employee for the
kinds of conduct at issue in this context if actual authorization or
knowledge by other employees can be shown.229 Moreover, even
where the employee who has been discharged was not engaged in
concerted activity, a violation of section 8(a)(1) might still be found
where the effect of the discharge is to restrain or interfere with con-
certed activity by other employees. 230 Since Jones recognizes implic-
itly that conduct can be arguably prohibited where there is an
arguable factual basis to contend that the conduct is within the scope
of a section 8 prohibition,231 and there will be many cases in which
there will be at least an arguable basis to contend that the conduct of
the employee for which he was discharged was discussed with, or ap-
proved by, other employees, or that it had a chilling effect on con-
certed activity by other employees,232 the issue of preemption in this
context will not go away. As there currently exists an arguable basis
to contend, as a legal matter, that all discharges of this type are a re-
straint of concerted activity, and there will in any event continue to
exist in most cases at least an arguable basis to contend as a factual
matter that a particular discharge involved a restraint of concerted
activity, the initial Garmon requirement for preemption that the con-
duct sought to be regulated be at least arguably prohibited should be
little obstacle to preemption.
The more difficult question is whether one of the exceptions to the
Garmon doctrine applies. Any effort to apply at least the articulated
exceptions stalls at the outset, however, by reason of the almost lim-
itless malleability of the language used by the Court to describe the
exceptions. Thus, in the most general sense, the protection of em-
ployees against restraint or interference with concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection is perhaps the most basic protection the
NLRA provides. Such conduct, in this sense, could therefore hardly
229. See Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
230. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 101.
be described as only a peripheral concern of the Act.233 Viewed more
specifically, however, the regulation of conduct that, for example,
frustrates a state workers' compensation system or inhibits the re-
porting of violations of state law is something that is clearly only a
peripheral concern of the Act at best.
Similarly, there is substantial ambiguity in the exception to Gar-
mon preemption for a state's efforts to regulate conduct touching on
"interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in
the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be in-
ferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to
act... ."234 This language at least implies a test of longevity; a state
cause of action seemingly could not be "so deeply rooted" in local
feeling and responsibility that congressional intent could be inferred
to preserve the cause of action if it did not exist at the time Congress
adopted the Act.235 Under this interpretation, the exception would
not be available to state public policy wrongful discharge actions
since, as previously discussed, such actions were unknown until very
recently.236 On the other hand, the Court has seemingly rejected any
longevity requirement 237 and, has apparently made a term of art of
"the deeply rooted in local feeling" exception such that it now in-
volves "a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme
established by Congress. . .and the importance of the asserted cause
of action to the State .... "238 Of course, the problem this creates
for our purposes is that such a formulation describes not a rule of law
but an explanation for a result. By its own reformulated terms, the
"deeply rooted in local feeling" exception is now satisfied if the Court
determines not to preempt a state cause of action and not satisfied if
it does. The language in which the exception is phrased is accord-
ingly meaningless for purposes of resolving preemption questions
prospectively. A similar observation would be applicable to the
Farmer exception for state claims that do not "threaten undue inter-
ference" with the federal scheme. 23 9
Despite the lip service the Court has faithfully paid the original
233. Jones, 460 U.S. at 676.
234. Id.
235. The authorities cited in Garmon as illustrative of the intended scope of the ex-
ception all involved state efforts to regulate violence or threats of violence. See Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. at 244 n.2 (citing United Auto. Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U.S.
266 (1956); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954)).
236. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
237. See Jones, 460 U.S. at 687-88 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(noting the Court's
acceptance in Farmer of the relatively new tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
238. Id. at 676.
239. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Garmon exceptions, 240 it is probably fair to say that, at least since
Farmer, there has been only one exception to Garmon preemption of
arguably prohibited conduct. State laws otherwise preempted under
Garmon will not be preempted if, on balance, the adverse conse-
quences of preemption in a given context outweigh the benefits of a
uniform federal law of labor relations. An examination of how the
Court has struck this balance in past cases, and the impact of the re-
curring themes on the process can provide at least some guidance in
determining the ability of public policy wrongful discharge actions to
survive preemption.
At one point, a popular defense against preemption was that the
state was applying a law of general applicability rather than one spe-
cifically directed to labor relations. Although rejected in both
Lockridge24 1 and Farner,242 the argument was accepted at least to
some extent in Sears. Sears suggested that, while a state law may not
be saved from preemption simply because it is a law of general appli-
cability, the rationale of preemption has its greatest force when ap-
plied to a state law expressly governing labor relations.243 Although
the distinction was offered in Sears to support the Court's finding
that the law of general application was not preempted, the same dis-
tinction would naturally support the argument in favor of preemp-
tion when the state law in question is specifically directed to labor
relations.
Sears seemed to hold that preemption would not be required unless
the controversy presented to the state court would be "identical to
... that which could have been ... presented to the Board."244 De-
pending upon what is ultimately resolved with respect to the Alleluia
doctrine, the Sears "identical controversy" concept might or might
not be relevant in this context. If the Board continues to utilize the
Alleluia constructive concerted activity concept, the only issue before
the Board would be one of causation. The issue is whether the dis-
charge was caused by the employee's having filed a workers' compen-
240. See, e.g., Jones, 460 U.S. at 675-76, 683.
241. See Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 292.
242. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 300.
243. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 194-95 n.24, 197-98 n.27. This concept was more recently
accepted in the plurality opinion of the Court in the context of another preemption
doctrine in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 533
(1979). It was rejected, however, by five of the Justices in that case. Id. at 550-51
(Blackmun & Marshall, J.J., concurring); id. at 557-58 (Powell & Stewart, J.J., Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
244. Sears, 436 U.S at 197.
sation claim, having reported the employer's safety violation, or some
other similar conduct. As this would also be the sole substantive is-
sue in the state court proceeding, the controversies would be essen-
tially identical. If the constructive concerted activity concept of
Alleluia is not utilized, the Board would also consider whether the
conduct alleged to have resulted in the employee's discharge was,
"concerted" activity or whether, even if not concerted, the discharge
nevertheless chilled concerted activity by other employees. As such
inquiries would be irrelevant to the state court proceeding, the con-
troversies, at least to this extent, would not be identical.
All of this is now probably irrelevant, however, as the strict Sears
"identical controversy" requirement seems to have been largely aban-
doned. As previously discussed,245 Jones interpreted this test to be
satisfied if "a fundamental part" or the "same crucial element" would
be involved in both the unfair labor practice proceeding and the state
suit.246 Moreover, the "fundamental part" or "crucial element" in-
volved in Jones was also causation. In Jones, the fact that a "funda-
mental part" of both the Board proceeding and the state suit was
whether the union had actually caused Jones' discharge was seen as
sufficient to satisfy the Sears "identical controversy" requirement. In
the present context, the fact that a fundamental part of both a Board
proceeding and a state suit would be whether the employee's conduct
had been the cause of his discharge should be equally sufficient to
satisfy this requirement.
One factor appears to have had great significance to the Court in
finding that the state interest is sufficient to justify not finding a
state suit preempted under Garmon. Although the Court has not al-
lowed the availability of greater recovery in a state forum to be used
to escape preemption, 247 the prospect of denying recovery entirely for
a discrete injury if the state claim is preempted has seemed to be
very significant. Under the "arguably protected" branch of Garmon,
perhaps the single most significant factor in the Sears decision which
caused the Court to find the state claim not preempted was the fact
that, if Sears' state suit were to be preempted, Sears would have no
legal remedy for the union's continuing trespass.248 Under the "ar-
guably prohibited" branch, the Court's reluctance to leave an injury
without a remedy was a factor in each of the cases discussed previ-
ously in which the Court found the state claims not preempted;
Linn,249 Farmer,250 and Belknap.251 Conversely, in each of the two
245. See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
246. Jones, 460 U.S. at 682.
247. See id. at 684 (summarily rejecting contention that availability of punitive
damages and attorneys fees in state proceeding justifies not preempting state claim).
248. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 203-07. "
249. In Linn, the Court noted that "[t]he Board can award no damages, impose no
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post-Garmon decisions preempting the state remedies, Lockridge and
Jones, the basic injury in both cases was the plaintiff's allegedly
wrongful discharge, an injury the Board had full power to remedy by
reinstatement and back pay.
Finally, an additional factor of less clear significance is also re-
flected in the Court's decisions. Often conduct that the state seeks to
regulate is only arguably, rather than clearly, prohibited by the
NLRA because the case involves a factual dispute that must be re-
solved by a fact finder before it can be determined whether the con-
duct at issue is prohibited.2 52 At times, the Court has seemed to
attach little significance to allowing the state court to resolve this ini-
tial inquiry so that it could apply its own remedy to the extent the
conduct was found not prohibited or protected by the Act.253 At
other times, however, the Court has determined that allowing the
state court to make this initial determination necessarily violates the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and has found preemption re-
quired to prevent this. The latter position, adopted first in Garmon
itself,254 appears to be the Court's current view. As explained in the
context of the factual issue in Jones,
penalty, or give any other relief to the defamed individual .... The Board's lack of
concern with the 'personal' injury caused by malicious libel, together with its inability
to provide redress to the maligned party, vitiates the ordinary arguments for preemp-
tion." Linn, 383 U.S. at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
250. In Farmer, the Court noted that "[w]hether the statements or conduct of the
respondents also caused Hill severe emotional distress and physical ihjury would play
no role in the Board's disposition of the case, and the Board could not award Hill dam-
ages for pain, suffering, or medical expenses." Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304.
251. In Belknap, the Court, quoting Linn, again noted that the fraudulent misrep-
resentation claims of the discharged "permanent" employees could not be remedied by
the Board. "It is no less true here than it was in [Linn] ... that '[t]he injury' reme-
died by the state law 'has no relevance to the Board's function' and that '[t]he Board
can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief' to the plaintiffs in
this case." Belknap, 463 U.S. at 511 (quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 63).
252. In Garmon, the purpose of the picketing, which would determine whether it
was prohibited by the Act, was disputed. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38. In Linn, it
was unclear whether the libel was malicious, which would render it not protected by
the Act, or non-malicious. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 60-61. In Sears, it was again the pur-
pose of the picketing that would determine whether it was prohibited. See Sears, 436
U.S. at 304-05. The status of the fraudulent misrepresentation in Belknap as also an
unfair labor practice would turn on whether the strike had become an unfair labor
practice strike. See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 507-08. In Jones, the status of the alleged in-
terference with the plaintiff's contractual relations as also being an unfair labor prac-
tice would turn on whether the interference was coercive. See Jones, 460 U.S. at 682.
253. See Jones, 460 U.S. at 686-87 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (summarizing cases).
254. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45. As previously set out, the concern that the
Board, and not the state courts, should be making the findings on which the question
of the applicability of the NLRA to the conduct in question turns is the analytical
permitting state causes of action for noncoercive interference with contractual
relations to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state
court to decide in the first instance whether the Union's conduct was coercive,
and hence beyond its power to sanction, or noncoercive, and thus the proper
subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should
be resolved by the Board.2 5
5
Based on these themes found in the Court's prior cases, we can sys-
thesize our own criteria to aid in measuring the courts future action.
At issue is how the Court will weigh the state interest in public pol-
icy wrongful discharge suits against the federal interest in having the
Board resolve such claims as violations of the employee's right to en-
gage in concerted activity. This synthesis leads to the tests below.
Each test seems to indicate the preemption of such claims.
(1) State public policy wrongful discharge actions are specifically
directed to regulating the employer's right to discharge. They there-
fore are not laws of general application. Under Sears, preemption
would be indicated. 256
(2) As previously discussed, a "fundamental part" of both a pro-
ceeding before the Board and the state court, in this context, would
be the basic question of causation: did the employer discharge the
employee because of his having filed the workers' compensation
claim, having reported the safety violation, or for other similar con-
duct? Under Jones, preemption would be indicated.257
(3) Both before the Board or before the state court, the dis-
charged employee seeks back pay and reinstatement. Denial of ac-
cess to the state forum would therefore not deprive the employee of a
remedy for the injury in question. Under all of the Court's post-Gar-
mon preemption decisions, preemption would therefore be
indicated.258
(4) Although this is not clear, it seems that, to avoid regulating
foundation for the Garmon doctrine itself. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying
text.
255. Jones, 460 U.S. at 682.
256. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that
the three member plurality opinion in New York Telephone determined that the un-
employment compensation statute at issue was "a law of general applicability." New
York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 533. This was based on the plurality's observation that the
statute "does not primarily concern labor-management relations" but was rather a
means to provide security for all unemployed workers. Id. at 534. Defined in this
manner, the "laws of general applicability" test might be sufficiently broad to encom-
pass state public policy wrongful discharge actions. However, both Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion and the three member dissent refused to accept this definition. See
id. at 546 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 557 (Powell & Stewart, J.J., Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The remaining two Justices failed to reach this question in light of their
view that there is no distinction for preemption purposes between state laws of general
applicability and laws specifically directed to labor relations. See id. at 547-51 (Black-
mun & Marshall, J.J., concurring).
257. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
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conduct actually prohibited by the NLRA which is within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Board, the state court in all public policy
wrongful discharge actions may necessarily be called on to determine
whether the discharged employee was engaged in concerted activ-
ity.259 This appears to be the same kind of inquiry that the Court in
Jones required to be made by the Board and thus also seems to indi-
cate preemption. 260
259. This is the implication of Jones. In fact, of course, the state court in Jones
would probably have been wholly unconcerned with whether the union's interference
with Jones' contractual relations was coercive; any interference, whether coercive or
not, would be sufficient. A similar approach was found acceptable in Sears. There, the
Court actually relied on the state court's lack of concern with the motive of the picket-
ing as a justification for allowing the state to regulate its location. See Sears, 436 U.S.
at 198. Similarly, the Court in Farmer at first used the same logic, reasoning that the
fact that the state court need not consider whether the union's conduct was discrimina-
tory argued against a finding of preemption. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 304-05.
The majority in Jones, however, returned to the original Garmon concept that state
courts cannot be allowed to disregard or themselves resolve the question that will de-
termine whether, or the extent to which, arguably prohibited conduct is actually pro-
hibited. Disagreement with this concept and its implicit abandonment of the opposite
approach taken by the Court in Sears formed one of the principal grounds for the dis-
sent in Jones. Jones, 460 U.S. at 686-87 (Rehnquist, Powell & O'Conner, J.J., dissent-
ing).
To avoid regulating con'duct actually prohibited, the state court must always ex-
amine whatever factor made the conduct arguably prohibited in the first place so that
the state remedy can be limited to conduct not prohibited by the Act. This was true in
Linn, in which the Court implicitly required the state court to determine whether the
libel was malicious, and thus not protected by the Act, before a state remedy could be
provided. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 64-65. Similarly, in Farmer the Court required the
state court to limit the plaintiff's recovery to conduct other than union discrimination,
the conduct prohibited by the Act. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305-36.
All of the Justices in Jones recognized that the state court could not simply ignore
the issue that would determine whether the conduct there at issue was prohibited by
the Act. The difference in the two positions was that the majority held that this fact
required preemption, as the issue must be resolved by the Board, not the state courts.
The dissent would have allowed the state court to resolve the issue.
In state public policy wrongful discharge litigation, the issue that causes the conduct
in question to be arguably prohibited is the possibility that the employee's actions for
which he was allegedly discharged may have constituted concerted activity, or that the
discharge might have otherwise chilled the employees' right to engage in concerted ac-
tivity, and therefore the employee's discharge might have violated section 8(a)(1). To
avoid regulating actually prohibited conduct, the state courts would therefore be re-
quired to resolve the question whether the particular conduct in question interfered
with concerted activity.
260. The implications of Jones in this area must be qualified since the concept is
sufficiently sweeping to threaten much of the Garmon progeny, something the Court
may not, on reflection, be willing to do. If we accept the Garmon/Jones concept that it
is the Board, not the state courts, that must resolve the question that makes the con-
duct arguably prohibited in the first instance, it is difficult to justify any exceptions to
Garmon. The reasoning is circular and leads in all cases to a conclusion of preemption.
Thus, if (1) states cannot be allowed to regulate conduct actually prohibited by the
The criteria available from the Court's prior application of Garmon
suggest that state public policy wrongful discharge actions should be
preempted. There exist, however, broader policy justifications for
this result that are applicable to essentially all of the various forms of
wrongful discharge actions that the states have recently adopted.
These are discussed below.
B. The Machinists doctrine
The Garmon doctrine deals with the preemption of conduct at least
arguably protected or prohibited by the Act. The rationale support-
ing the doctrine, considered in the abstract, would suggest that con-
duct that cannot satisfy the initial Garmon inquiry, that is, conduct
not even arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, should be
available for regulation by the states. Although this was the original
position of the Supreme Court in the Briggs-Stratton case, 26 1 experi-
ence with the application of the Act in time compelled the Court to
abandon Briggs-Stratton and extend substantially the scope of NLRA
preemption.
The development of what would eventually become the Machinists
doctrine began in dicta in Garner v. Teamsters Local .776.262 Garner
involved an application of the Court's pre-Garmon approach to the
preemption of state regulation of picketing prohibited by the
NLRA.263 However, in discussing what the Court seemed to find to
be an interesting argument against preemption in which the state
claim was defended as a protection of a purely private right that
therefore could not interfere with the assertedly public rights pro-
tected by the NRLA, the Court concluded that, since the federal stat-
ute contained a detailed procedure for restraint of specified types of
picketing, this implied that other picketing was to be free of "other
Act, (2) to avoid this prospect, a determination must therefore first be made that ar-
guably prohibited conduct is not, in fact, actually prohibited conduct, and (3) this de-
termination must be made by the Board, not the state courts, all roads seem to lead to
the Board. The answer to this will probably be provided by future cases in which the
Court recognizes that its actual position on this issue has historically been somewhere
between the absolutist positions of the majority and the dissent in Jones. Some ques-
tions that cause the conduct in question to be arguably prohibited will be capable of
resolution only by the Board, as in Garmon and Jones, others will be deemed safe for
resolution by the state courts, as in Linn and Farmer. For our purposes, it is enough
to conclude that the determination of whether a discharge interferes with or restrains
concerted employee activity is sufficiently similar in terms of the areas in which the
Board has developed significant expertise and sensitivity to the determination in Jones
whether the union's interference was coercive that it probably is also one that the
Court should conclude must be made by the Board.
261. United Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
262. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
263. Id. at 487-89.
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methods and sources of restraint."264 The Court's conclusion estab-
lished in dicta the concept that later became in a more general sense
the Machinists doctrine. "For a state to impinge on the area of labor
combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal
policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by
methods which the federal Act prohibits."265
The development of the Garner concept of preempting state regu-
lation of conduct "permitted" by the Act was assisted by a number of
the Court's decisions holding that the NLRB was not permitted, in
the guise of regulating the bargaining obligations of parties, to inter-
fere with the economic weapons Congress had intended to allow the
parties to use.266 The most significant of these holdings, NLRB v. In-
surance Agents, 267 was quoted in Machinists.
For the Court soon recognized that a particular activity might be "protected"
by federal law not only when it fell within § 7, but also when it was an activ-
ity that Congress intended to be "unrestricted by any governmental power to
regulate" because it was among the permissible "economic weapons in re-
serve, . . . actual exercise [of which] on occasion by the parties, is part and
parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have
recognized." 2 6
8
The Court returned to the question of the preemption of state rem-
edies in this context in Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton.269 During the
course of an economic strike, the union in Morton had attempted to
bring secondary pressure on some of the employer's customers.270
264. Id. at 499.
265. Id. at 500. Perhaps in recognition of the potential of this concept, the Court's
analysis in Garmon six years after Garner seemed to leave open for future develop-
ment the concept that conduct not preempted by application of the Garmon doctrine
might nevertheless still be preempted for other, unarticulated reasons. "[T]he Board
may decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the
question whether such activity may be regulated by the States." Garmon, 359 U.S. at
245.
266. See Lodge 76, International Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 145 (1976). In NLRB v. Nash-
Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971), an expression originated that was adopted by the Court
in Machinists and that subsequently became the single most popular rationale for the
Machinists doctrine. Thus, state remedies preempted under Machinists are said to be
disallowed because they seek to regulate conduct that Congress left unregulated be-
cause it wished it to remain as part of "the free play of economic forces." Machinists,
427 U.S. at 140 (quoting Nash-Finch, 404 U.S. at 144).
267. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
268. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 141 (quoting Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 488-89) (em-
phasis added).
269. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
270. Id. at 253. The object of a union's efforts in an economic strike is to make the
employer's resistance to the union's demands sufficiently expensive to compel the em-
ployer to yield. The refusal to work by the striking employees is intended to make
The employer then sued for damages under both federal and state
law.271 The lower courts found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that
the union's secondary pressure with respect to one of the customers
had been unlawful under the NLRA and therefore would support an
action for damages under federal law.272 The union's secondary pres-
sure against another customer was held to violate state, but not fed-
eral law.273 Damages were therefore awarded by the lower court
under state law.274 The Supreme Court reversed on this issue.
This weapon of self-help, permitted by federal law, formed an integral part of
the petitioner's effort to achieve its bargaining goals during negotiations ....
Allowing its use is a part of the balance struck by Congress between the con-
flicting interests of the union, the employees, the employer and the commu-
nity. . . . If the Ohio law of secondary boycott can be applied to proscribe the
same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe
when it enacted [section 8(b)(4)(B)], the inevitable result would be to frus-
trate the congressional determination to leave this weapon of self-help avail-
able, and to upset the balance of power between labor and management
expressed in our national labor policy.2 7 5
We speak today of the Machinists, rather than the Morton, doc-
trine because the Court in Morton did not purport to establish a rule
of general applicability and failed to expressly overturn Briggs-Strat-
ton. As Morton involved secondary boycotts, an area extensively con-
sidered and regulated by Congress, it arguably could be limited to its
facts. Encouraged by Morton, however, many commentators soon be-
gan to advocate the adoption of a rule preempting generally state reg-
ulation of conduct that Congress did not specifically protect in the
NLRA but nevertheless intended to remain available for the parties'
use.276 The Court's response, in 1976, was the Machinists doctrine.
impossible, or at least more difficult or expensive, the continued production of the em-
ployer's goods or services and thereby reduce or eliminate its profit. The union's pri-
mary picketing of the employer is intended to encourage all of the employees to
support the strike by also refusing to work. In addition, the union's hope is that many
of the persons having business with the employer, such as truck drivers delivering raw
materials or picking up the finished product, will refuse to cross the picket line and
further interfere with production and sales. Secondary pressure by the union involves
appeals directed to the employer's suppliers or customers in an effort to cause these
secondary employers to cease doing business with the primary employer. For a fuller
explanation of the concept of secondary activity and the attempts to regulate it, see C.
MORRIS, supra note 64, at 1129-91.
271. 377 U.S. at 253-54.
272. Id. at 255-56. With respect to this customer, it was determined that the union's
secondary pressure consisted of appeals to the employees of the secondary employer to
force their employer to cease doing business with the primary employer. Id. at 255.
This is prohibited conduct under section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B), and the
LMRA specifically provides for a federal cause of action to recover damages for viola-
tions of this section. See 29 U.S.C. §187 (1982).
273. Morton, 377 U.S. at 255. With respect to this customer, it was determined that
that union's secondary pressure consisted of appeals directly to the management of the
secondary employer. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 259-60.
276. The two most influential of these articles are quoted by the Court in Machin-
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The conduct at issue in Machinists was the concerted refusal of
employees to work overtime, a tactic used to exert pressure on the
employer during contract negotiations. Following charges filed by
the employer with the NLRB, the Board's Regional Director held
that this tactic was not prohibited by the NLRA.277 The employer
then filed a complaint with the state agency alleging that the tactic
was an unfair labor practice under state law.278 The state agency
agreed and granted a cease and desist order against the union's tactic,
holding the employer's complaint not preempted as the conduct in
question was neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited
under the NLRA.279
The Court appeared to accept the state agency's conclusion that the
concerted refusal to work overtime was neither arguably protected
nor arguably prohibited by the Act.28 0 Expressly overruling Briggs-
Stratton,281 the Court then announced that its decisions had effec-
tively established "a second line of pre-emption analysis ... focusing
upon the crucial inquiry whether Congress intended that the conduct
involved be unregulated because [it was] left 'to be controlled by the
free play of economic forces.' "282 After summarizing much of the
history of the doctrine discussed above,28 3 the Court noted that its
new doctrine, though largely developed in the context of protecting
self help by unions and employees, was also applicable to the "eco-
nomic weapons" of employers that Congress intended to be free from
regulation.28 4 As summarized by the Court, the Machinists doctrine
was to be equally available to all. "Whether self-help economic activi-
ties are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry regarding
preemption is the same: whether 'the exercise of plenary state au-
thority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effec-
ists, 427 U.S. at 140 n.4 (quoting Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1337, 1352 (1972); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirma-
tion of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 478, 480 (1972)).
277. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 133-35.
278. Id. at 135.
279. Id. at 135-36. The order was subsequently enforced in the state courts. Id. at
136.
280. This is not clear in the Court's opinion. However, the Court made no attempt
to dispute the state agency's finding to this effect. Also, this seems logically required
by the fact that the Court used the case to establish a new doctrine for preemption of
conduct neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited by the Act, instead of ap-
plying the Gamon doctrine. See also id. at 157 n.1 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 154.
282. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 147 (dicta).
tive implementation of the Act's processes.' "285
The first opportunity for the Court to apply the Machinists doc-
trine occured in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Depart-
ment of Labor.286 The case involved a state unemployment
compensation scheme that permitted striking employees to receive
benefits that were in large measure indirectly financed by their em-
ployer, after an eight week waiting period.28 7 The struck employer
in New York Telephone sued for declaratory and injunctive relief in-
validating the state statute. The relief was granted by the District
Court, which held that the payment of unemployment compensation
to the strikers conflicted "with the policy of free collective bargaining
established in the federal labor laws. .... ,2ss On appeal this finding
was accepted by the Second Circuit. However the appellate court re-
versed the invalidation of the state statute and based its decision on
the rationale that Congress had not expressly forbidden unemploy-
ment compensation for strikers and the court's conclusion from the
legislative history of the NLRA and the Social Security Act that the
failure to forbid such payments was deliberate.28 9
Although the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's refusal to invali-
date the state statute, it is unclear just what significance the Court's
opinion has. In an opinion joined, inter alia, by Justices Rehnquist
and Stewart, Justice Stevens' dissent in Machinists was based, in
part, on his contention that in the absence of a showing that Con-
gress had intended to leave the partial strike activity at issue in Ma-
chinists unregulated, the Court should adhere to Briggs-Stratton.290
Unsuccessful in Machinists, Justice Stevens, again joined, inter alia,
by Justice Rehnquist, wrote the three member plurality opinion for
the Court in New York Telephone that accomplished to at least some
extent what he had failed to accomplish in Machinists. Thus, the
New York Telephone plurality opinion, while agreeing that the state
had altered the economic balance between labor and management, 291
sustained the Second Circuit's refusal to invalidate the state's pay-
ment of unemployment compensation to strikers. The opinion was
based initially on the rationale that, as a law of general application
rather than one specifically directed to concerted activity, the Court
would review the state law with the same "deference" it employs
under the Garmon "deeply rooted in local feeling" exception and sus-
285. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394
U.S. 369, 380 (1969)).
286. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
287. Id. at 523-24.
288. Id. at 525-26 (quoting from the district court opinion, 434 F. Supp. 810, 819
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
289. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 526-27.
290. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 157-58 (Stevens, Rehnquist & Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
291. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 531-32.
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tain the law "in the absence of compelling congressional direction" of
an intent to preempt.292 The plurality then continued to find such an
absence of a "compelling congressional direction" to preempt the
state statute. Indeed, the plurality found what it considered to be an
intent discernable in the legislative history of both the NLRA and
the Social Security Act293 not to preempt such statutes.294
The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, agreeing on this point
with the dissent, questioned whether the state statute properly could
be considered one of general applicability. However, Justice Brennan
concurred on the basis that the congressional history relied on by the
plurality established a congressional intent not to preempt the stat-
ute.295 The concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, concurred in the judgment for the same reason as
Justice Brennan, but went further in its disagreement with the plu-
rality's approach. In the view of these Justices, Machinists would not
permit a state statute that admittedly altered the economic balance
between labor and management to escape preemption simply because
no "compelling congressional direction" existed to preempt the stat-
ute. In their view, Machinists established that "there is preemption
unless there is evidence of congressional intent to tolerate the state
practice."296
In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Stewart, contended that the state statute was not one of general
applicability and that, even if it were, this should have nothing to do
with whether it was preempted.297 In common with the position of
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, the dissent interpreted Machinists
to require evidence of congressional intent to tolerate a balance dis-
rupting state law if it is to escape preemption, an intent the dissent
could not find under the facts of New York Telephone.298
The Court in New York Telephone was in agreement that an excep-
tion to Machinists preemption exists; states will be allowed to disrupt
the union-management balance of power where Congress has indi-
cated that they may do so. The effort by the three member plurality
292. Id. at 533-40.
293. 49 Stat. 639, amended and recodified as Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982), 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, §§1101-1109 (1982).
294. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 536-46.
295. Id. at 546-47 (Brennan, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 549 (Blackmun & Marshall, J.J., concurring) (emphasis Justice
Blackmun's).
297. Id. at 557-58 (Powell & Stewart, J.J., Burger, C.J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 560-67.
to expand the scope of the exception in the case of state laws of gen-
eral applicability was rejected, however, by five of the Justices and
unaddressed by the remaining one.
The Court's next opportunity to apply the Machinists doctrine
came in Belknap. In addition to its effort to preempt the misrepre-
sentation and breach of contract claims of the discharged "perma-
nent" replacements 299 under Garmon, the employer in Belknap also
argued that the state claims should be preempted under Machinists
since allowing the state remedies assertedly burdened its right to hire
permanent replacements during an economic strike.300
The Court concluded that the Machinists doctrine was inapplicable
to the Belknap facts. It could not believe that Congress had intended
to provide immunity from state remedies so that employers could
utilize fraudulent misrepresentations and willful contract breaches
against innocent third parties as economic weapons. 301 A familiar
299. See supra notes 161-84 and accompanying text.
300. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 499. The argument was far from frivolous. The possibil-
ity of being permanently replaced is a substantial disincentive to beginning a strike in
the first place. If perceived as likely to be successful, the employer's announcement of
an intent to begin hiring permanent replacements is also a powerful inducement both
to the union to accept the employer's terms and end the strike and to individual em-
ployees to abandon the strike and return to work. Finally, the availability to an em-
ployer of the right to lay off "permanent" replacements to allow strikers to return to
work is very powerful leverage that can be used to induce the union to end a strike or,
as in Belknap, resolve unfair labor practice charges. The effect of not preempting the
state claims of the replacements in Belknap is to make the employer choose between
either not offering applicants unconditional status as permanent replacements, which
may make it very difficult to induce them to leave other jobs and accept employment;
or else not having the leverage provided by being able to agree to lay off the replace-
ments to allow the strikers to return, which in many cases will make it much more
difficult to end the strike on the employer's terms.
The unique feature of Belknap, however, is that, in this instance, burdening the em-
ployer's weapon also burdened the union's. Given that employers would continue to
be allowed to hire permanent replacements during a strike, employees, and thus their
union, have a powerful interest in there being no legal consequence associated with the
employer's subsequent agreement to lay off the replacements so that the strikers can
return to work. If it is known that persons hired as "permanent replacements" are in-
deed permanent in the sense that they have legal recourse if laid off to allow strikers
to return, the employer's task of inducing such persons to accept employment becomes
easier and the intended effect of the union's strike in disrupting the employer's busi-
ness is, to that extent, lessened. Perhaps more importantly, Belknap makes available
to employers a powerful inducement to employees to abandon the strike: the knowl-
edge by strikers that permanent replacements cannot subsequently be laid off without
perhaps ruinous liability for the employer. This makes very real the employer's an-
nouncement of an intent to hire permanent replacements and threatens what is, in the
end, the union's major economic weapon-the solidarity of its membership.
301. See id. at 500, where the court stated:
It is one thing to hold that the federal law intended to leave the employer and
the union free to use their economic weapons against one another, but it is
quite another to hold that either the employer or the union is also free to in-
jure innocent third parties without regard to the normal rules of law gov-
erning those relationships. We cannot agree with the dissent that Congress
intended such a lawless regime.
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theme under Garmon302 thus unnecessarily became a component of
analysis under Machinists.303
302. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
303. The Court's concern for the rights of the strike replacements as individuals is
to an extent antithetical to the concept of collective bargaining that is at the core of
the NLRA. As argued by the Board as amicus in Belknap, the replacements, upon ac-
cepting jobs with Belknap, became members of the bargaining unit, a unit that the Act
gives the union the exclusive right to represent. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 507. See also Em-
porium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1975).
There is no apparent reason consistent with the federal scheme why the union, as the
bargaining agent for all bargaining unit employees including both strikers and replace-
ments, should not have the right to negotiate a strike settlement agreement that is ef-
fective to waive any individual contractual rights enforceable under state law
possessed by the replacement employees in the same manner that it may waive the
individual statutory right to strike possessed by the striking employees. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)(recognizing that only the
union has the right to negotiate terms and conditions of employment and that, in doing
so, the union is authorized to waive even individual statutory rights under the NLRA);
Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1983)(recognizing that em-
ployers are entitled to rely on union's waiver of individual employee rights). If the
union unfairly represents the interests of the replacements in negotiating the strike
settlement agreement, they would have a right to proceed against the union alleging a
breach of the duty of fair representation. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffers v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Swatts v. United Steel
Workers, 585 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Ind. 1984). See generally Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). As recognized in Vaca, and reaffirmed subsequently, this remedy is provided to
employees for the express purpose of constituting a substitute for persons "stripped of
traditional forms of redress" by the federal labor law. See IBEW v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42,
47 (1979) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182).
The Court in Belknap dismissed the Board's argument along these lines in a single
paragraph by noting that it had been rejected in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944). See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 507. The Court had held in Case that an employer
could not interpose the existence of preexisting individual contracts as a defense to its
obligation to bargain with the union and directed that the employer cease giving effect
to such contracts "without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee
may have acquired under such contract. ... 321 U.S. at 342. Beyond the doubtful
continuing validity of this early case in light of the subsequent recognition by the
Court that the union possesses-indeed, must possess-the right to waive individual
rights in its role as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees within the unit,
the Belknap Court overlooked a critical distinction between the facts in Case and those
of Belknap. The individual contracts at issue in Case were entered into before the
union became the certified bargaining agent and thus, at one point at least, were
clearly valid and enforceable agreements. Id. at 333. In Belknap, the individual con-
tracts with the replacements were entered into after the union had become the bar-
gaining agent. As the union at that point had the exclusive right to negotiate contract
terms for all unit employees, which necessarily included the replacements, it is doubt-
ful at best that Belknap and the replacements possessed any power under federal law
to enter into a binding agreement, at least in the absence of Belknap's having bar-
gained to impass with the union over the terms of such agreements. See generally C.
MORRIS, supra note 64, at 634-39. If, as a result of federal law, the individual contracts
in Belknap were void or unenforceable ab initio, it follows that they could not be
made enforceable by state law.
The Belknap Court also considered an argument under Machinists
that the state claims should be preempted because allowing such
claims would make the settlement of strikes and unfair labor practice
charges much more difficult and therefore would frustrate the fed-
eral policy favoring the settlement of labor disputes.304 This argu-
ment, which would implicitly expand the Machinists doctrine, was
rejected by the Court through, in part, the expedient of changing the
then-existing law to largely eliminate the impact of allowing the
state claims on the settlement process.305
In its most recent application of the Machinists doctrine, Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,306 the Court returned
somewhat ambiguously to the question that divided the Court in New
York Telephone: is a balance disrupting state action preempted un-
less congressional intent can be discovered to permit the state's ac-
tion or must the proponent of preemption carry the burden of
establishing congressional intent to preempt? The issue is critically
important to the framework of analysis under Machinists30 7 and had
been left largely unresolved by the various opinions in New York
Telephone.30 8
The employer in Golden State, a taxicab company, operated under
304. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 501, 505-06.
305. Prior to Belknap, employers had a dual motive for hiring replacements on a
permanent basis. This was seen as both necessary to induce potential employees to
leave other jobs and accept employment and, perhaps more importantly, essential to
achieve the intended effect in breaking the strike, since, as a matter of law, employees
not hired as permanent replacements would have to be laid off at the conclusion of the
strike to allow the strikers to return. Id. at 501. The strikers' knowledge of this fact
would largely eliminate the intended impact on their willingness to continue the strike
if the employer hired replacements on any basis other than as permanent employees.
Having been essentially compelled to hire the replacements as unconditionally perma-
nent employees to achieve the intended effect, the prospect of the employer's having
to respond in damages in the event it were to execute a strike settlement that provides
for the replacements being laid off was seen as greatly discouraging the willingness of
employers to agree to such settlements.
The Court's answer to this problem was to hold that replacement employees are
sufficiently "permanent" to permit them to be retained at the conclusion of the strike
if they are given "permanent employment, subject only to settlement with . . . [the]
union and to a Board unfair labor practice order directing reinstatement of the strik-
ers. . . ." Id. at 503. In the Court's view, this eliminated the problem of federal law as
a shield for misrepresentation, preserved the employer's leverage, and would not in-
hibit settlements where the employer had made such a conditional offer of permanent
employment to the strikers. Id. at 503-06.
306. 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986).
307. Congress has never indicated its intent with respect to the preemption of state
law under the NLRA. See supra note 65. Because of this, a balance disrupting state
action would normally be preempted if congressional intent to permit the state action
must be shown to avoid preemption. Conversely, if the proponent of preemption
under Machinists must establish both that the effect of a particular state action is to
disrupt the labor-management balance of power and that Congress intended to pre-
clude this type of disruption, preemption will normally be very difficult to establish.
308. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
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a franchise from the city that came up for renewal during the course
of an economic strike by the union.3 09 At the urging of the union,
the city's Board of Transportation denied the renewal of the
franchise because of the pending labor dispute31o In fact, the Dis-
trict Court found that the council conditioned the renewal on the la-
bor dispute being settled.3 l1 When no such settlement was reached,
the franchise expired by its terms. Golden State then sued for dam-
ages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief to restore the
franchise. 312 After twice refusing to hear the case at earlier stages,313
the Court ultimately granted certiorari to review the summary judg-
ment granted the city denying the relief sought by Golden State.314
Writing for the Court's eight member majority, Justice Blackmun
held the city's action in conditioning the franchise renewal on the
settlement of the labor dispute was preempted under Machinists.
The focus of the opinion, however, is largely directed to supporting
the conclusion that the intent of Congress, as evidenced by the lan-
guage of the NLRA and its legislative history, was to leave the par-
ties of a labor dispute free to utilize such ecomonic leverage as they
might possess. In this case, the Court held that the city's action sub-
stantially interfered with Golden State's ability to use such lever-
age.3 15 The Court's opinion, consistent with Justice Blackmun's
position in New York Telephone,3 16 suggests that a balance disrupting
state action will be preempted unless it can be shown that Congress
intended to tolerate such disruption.317
309. Golden State, 106 S. Ct. at 1396.
310. Id. at 1396-97.
311. Id. at 1399.
312. Id. at 1397.
313. Id. at 1397, n.1.
314. Id. at 1398.
315. See id. at 1398-1401.
316. Justice Blackmun had been unable to join in the plurality opinion in New
York Telephone largely because of his inability to accept the plurality's view that pre-
emption under Machinists requires a showing of a compelling congressional intent to
preempt the specific state action in question. See supra note 291 and accompanying
text. In his view, Machinists established that "there is preemption unless there is evi-
dence of congressional intent to tolerate the practice." New York Telephone, 440 U.S.
at 549 (Blackmun & Marshall, J.J., concurring) (emphasis Justice Blackmun's).
317. The issue is discussed indirectly twice in the Court's opinion. The Court ini-
tially notes that "(s]tates are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictions
on economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts ... unless such restrici-
tions presumably were contemplated by Congress." Golden State, 106 S. Ct. at 1399 (ci-
tations omitted). At a later point, the Court somewhat less ambiguously returns to
this issue. "In some areas of labor relations that the NLRA left unregulated, we have
concluded that Congress contemplated state regulation .... Los Angeles, however,
Golden State is the Court's most recent consideration of the appli-
cation of the Machinists doctrine31s In contrast to the wide fluctua-
tions over time associated with Garmon, the Machinists doctrine is
relatively unchanged. In the absence of congressional intent to per-
mit state interference in a given area, the application of state law to
restrict or penalize the use of economic weapons the federal scheme
contemplates that employers and unions may employ will be pre-
empted. In the context of state wrongful discharge remedies, there is
a substantial impact on the economic weapons of both employers and
unions that may well require preemption under Machinists. Part of
this is obvious, much of it is much less so.
Under Machinists, there is one obvious area of preemption of state
efforts to provide a remedy for discharged employees. There are a
number of different contexts under the NLRA in which the em-
ployer is permitted to discharge employees as a legitimate economic
weapon in resisting the weapons employed by the union. For exam-
ple, employers may discharge employees who:
(1) engage in a sitdown strike;319
(2) disparage the product of their employer to the public;320
(3) engage in violence;321
(4) divulge confidential information damaging to the employer;322
(5) engage in a partial or intermittent strike;3 23
(6) engage in a slowdown;324
(7) strike in violation of a no-strike clause in a collective bargain-
ing agreement;325 or
has pointed to no evidence of such congressional intent with respect to the conduct at
issue in this case." Id. at 1400 (citations and footnote omitted).
These two extracts from the Court's opinion in Golden State would constitute, of
themselves, weak support for the proposition that the Court has now accepted that a
balance disrupting state action will be preempted unless an affirmative congressional
intent not to preempt can be discovered. However, the lone dissenter in Golden State,
Justice Rehnquist, seems to have recognized this implication of the Court's analysis.
He was apparently unable to join the Court's opinion primarily because of his view
that the preemption of state action cannot properly be based on the absence of an ex-
pressed congressional intent to tolerate the state's involvement. See id. at 1401-04
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
318. Metropolitian Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985), is a pre-
emption case ostensibly based on the Machinists doctrine. Id. at 2394-95. In fact, the
Metropolitian Life decision has nothing to do with the Machinists doctrine and is in-
stead properly analyzed as a part of a third preemption doctrine discussed hereafter.
319. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939).
320. NLRB v. IBEW Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464 (1973).
321. Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 252.
322. NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1976).
323. Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589 (1954), enforced, 230 F.2d 947 (5th
Cir. 1956).
324. NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1005 (8th Cir. 1965).
325. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
[Vol. 13: 607, 1986] NLRA Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
(8) strike for a purpose prohibited by the Act. 326
With respect to these and the many other unprotected activities
under the Act, Machinists will clearly preempt any state efforts to
frustrate or penalize the employer's right to discharge the employee.
The impact of Machinists on state wrongful discharge remedies has
much greater potential than simply this, however, as such remedies
have a serious potential impact on one of the more effective weapons
of labor.
To fully understand the impact of the availability under state law
of a wrongful discharge remedy on unions, it is initially necessary to
understand the job protection commonly available to the unionized
employee. Virtually all collective bargaining agreements contain
some kind of restriction on the employer's power to discharge. The
great majority require "just cause" to support a discharge.327 Virtu-
ally all of these agreements are enforced by a grievance-arbitration
system.328 The concept of "just cause" is a term of art in this context
and is commonly interpreted in each case finally appealed to arbitra-
tion, to require that the employer carry the burden of proof to estab-
lish both that the employee in fact committed the offense for which
he assertedly was discharged329 and, in the opinion of most arbitra-
tors, that the penalty of discharge is appropriate for such an of-
fense.330 Moreover, discharges are also commonly overturned in
arbitration for such reasons as:
(1) a failure of the employer to utilize "corrective" discipline
rather than summary discharge;331
(2) an absence of "due process" in effecting the employee's dis-
charge as evidenced by the failure of the employer to give the
employee the opportunity to tell his side of the story before
the discharge or a failure by the employer in other respects to
make a reasonable investigation before the discharge;332
(3) a failure to take the employee's past record or length of ser-
vice into account in discharging the employee rather than im-
326. See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 1021.
327. See 2 Collective Bargaining, Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) 40:1 (1979)
(96% of collective bargaining agreements contain a job security provision; 80% allow
discharge only for just cause).
328. Id. at 51:1 (99% of collective bargaining agreements contain grievance-arbitra-
tion provisions).
329. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 661 (4th ed. 1985).
330. Id. at 664-66.
331. Id. at 630-32.
332. Id. at 632-34.
posing some lesser punishment;333
(4) a failure to show that the employee had been placed on notice
that he could be discharged for the conduct in question; 334 and
(5) a failure of the employer to have also discharged other em-
ployees for similar offenses.33 5
As one of the best known authorities in this area has noted,
"[e]mployees in the United States who are protected by arbitration
under collective agreements probably have more complete and sensi-
tive security against unjust discipline, more effective procedures, and
more effective remedies than employees in any other country in the
world." 33 6
This is very substantial protection against unfair discharge. It is
available, however, only to unionized employees, who constitute less
than one third of the non agricultural work force.337 For nonunion-
ized employees, it has been estimated that 6000-7500 employees are
discharged each year under circumstances that an arbitrator would
find to be without "just cause."3 3 8
These figures strongly suggest that until recently, one very power-
ful inducement available to unions seeking to organize employees
was the opportunity available almost exclusively by means of a union
to obtain meaningful job security. Much of the available research
suggests that this was one of the primary reasons for the growth of
unions in this country.339 Many employers, in recognition of the im-
pact of job security in the union's organizing arsenal, have unilater-
ally adopted grievance procedures that include binding, im partial
arbitration for the express purpose of preempting any potential
union organizing effort. 340
333. Id. at 638-41.
334. Id. at 641-43.
335. Id. at 643-46.
336. Summers, Protecting All Employees Against Unjust Dismissal, 58 HARV. Bus.
REV. 133 (Jan. - Feb. 1980).
337. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Em-
ployee Associations 1979 at 59, 74.
338. Peck, supra note 7, at 9-10. See also Note, Protecting Employees at Will
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1934
(1983)(estimating 150,000-200,000 discharges without just cause).
339. "One of the primary reasons for the growth of unionism and collective bar-
gaining was the employees' desire to modify and regulate the employer's power of dis-
charge." Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1448 (1975) (citing W. BAER, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE UNDER
THE LABOR AGREEMENT 1 (1972)); Bloomrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the
Exercise of Employer Disciplinary Power: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV.
428, 434 (1964); see also Catler, supra note 2, at 494. But see J. GERMAN, S. GOLDBERG
& J. HERMAN, Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality at 87-88 (1976)(con-
tending that employees during organizing campaigns normally discount the possibility
of job loss in deciding on the merits of unionization).
340. See Schauer, Disusssion, 32 Proc. of the Ann. Meeting of the Indus. Rel. Re-
search Ass'n 183-84 (1979) quoted in Catler, supra note 2, at 494 n. 147.
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What, then, is the impact of state efforts to provide remedies for
wrongful discharge on this "weapon" of unions? As Catler puts it,
[p]eople who would like to weaken labor unions should also be expected to be
among the supporters of these proposals .... If an employer-established plan
helps maintain nonunion status by effecting employee perception of the mar-
ginal advantage of a union contract, so too would a statutory scheme or judi-
cially mandated just cause standard.3 4 1
But the articulated purpose of the NLRA is not to frustrate, or im-
pede, union organizing efforts but to encourage them.342 If, as seems
clear from the language of the statute and its consistent interpreta-
tion, Congress had a number of objectives it wished to secure by
means of encouraging employee organization, any state remedy that
has the effect of depriving unions of one of their most valuable tools
in accomplishing this aim is at once suspect under Machinists.
However, the threat posed by state wrongful discharge remedies in
discouraging employee organization is not simply that they remove
an incentive to organization. The preemption doctrine threatens to
make such remedies actual disincentives to organization. As dis-
cussed in the following section of this article, most courts have cor-
rectly held that, with one limited exception unionized employees
protected by the just cause provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge under a state
remedy. 343 This means that by voting for the union an employee will
in most cases be voting to surrender his access to the state law
wrongful discharge remedy. Although an excellent argument can be,
and has been, made that the job security offered by the just cause
provision in a collective agreement is in many respects superior to
that available under state common law remedies,344 the problem here
is one of perception. The relative advantages of protection under a
just cause provision over that available under a state court remedy
If then an unorganized employer voluntarily offers an appeal procedure cul-
minating in binding arbitration and otherwise provides its employees with
competitive wages, benefits, and working conditions, what incentive will em-
ployees have to organize?
Installation of appeal procedures for at least discharge cases will in the next
five to ten years be a critically important factor in maintaining non-union
status.
341. Catler, supra note 2, at 494. Catler's research suggests that employers having
adopted such procedures have been very successful in resisting union organizing at-
tempts. See id. at 507-08.
342. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
343. See infra note 387 and accompanying text. The only exception to this appears
to be in the area of state public policy wrongful discharge actions. See infra notes 392-
97 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Catler, supra note 2, at 496-509.
are real but probably not easily grasped by the average worker. On
the other hand, the advantages of being able to recover punitive dam-
ages in a state court are obvious, if misleading.
The point under Machinists is not that preemption is required be-
cause arbitration is preferable to state court suits to protect employ-
ees against unjust dismissals. Machinists deals with the federal labor
scheme in which management and labor are each allowed the use of
economic weapons that state law cannot be used to frustrate in the
absence of a congressional intent to permit such interference. Con-
gress has at no point indicated a willingness to permit states to usurp
the function of unions in providing job security to employees.345 As
state wrongful discharge remedies threaten to seriously interfere
with the basic purpose of the Act itself to encourage employee organ-
ization, they are at risk under the Machinists doctrine.346
C. The Oliver doctrine
Both the Court and the commentators have tended to discuss
NLRA preemption of state law in terms exclusively confined to the
Garmon and Machinists doctrines. 347 There exists, however, a third,
analytically distinct, NLRA preemption doctrine of relevance to our
inquiry in unionized settings with a pedigree equally as impressive as
Garmon and Machinists.
345. Congress recently rejected an effort to amend the NLRA to provide all em-
ployees with protection against discharge without just cause. See The Industrial De-
mocracy Act, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). With the historic and consistently
affirmed preference in labor law for uniform federal regulation, it would be difficult to
contend that Congress wished to permit the states to do piecemeal what it declined to
do itself.
346. One type of wrongful discharge action should be relatively safe from Machin-
ists preemption, however. As previously discussed, it is analytically inconsistent for
courts to refuse to give contractual effect to job security promises contained in em-
ployee handbooks or personnel policies, if these are deliberately made known to em-
ployees. See supra note 58. Indeed, Machinists may actually require that all states
give contractual effect to such promises to the same extent the state law gives effect to
other unilateral employer promises. An assurance of job security may very well be a
deliberately selected economic weapon used by an employer to help preclude success-
ful union organizing attempts. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. A state's
refusal to give contractual effect generally to such provisions deprives the employer of
at least some of the anticipated value of the weapon.
In all events, since it is the employer in this context that provides the job security by
means of ordinary contract offer and acceptance, rather than the state by means of a
common law remedy available to all employees, neither employers nor unions could
properly complain under Machinists that the state was attempting to forbid or penal-
ize the use of an economic weapon by giving contractual effect to handbook or person-
nel policy job security provisions. Thus, the rationale behind Machinists cannot be
used to preempt such remedies.
347. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp., 106 S. Ct. at 1398; Metropolitan Life, 105
S. Ct. at 2394-95; Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498 ("Our cases have announced two doctrines
[Garmon and Machinists] for determining whether state regulations or causes of ac-
tion are preempted by the NLRA."); State Actions, supra note 15, at 951.
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In Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver,348 the collective bargaining agree-
ment had established rental rates to be paid when the employer
leased trucks owned and operated by the employee.349 The Ohio
courts had determined that the establishment of such uniform rental
rates violated the state antitrust law and enjoined its enforcement. 350
The Court in Oliver held, that the rental rates established in the col-
lective bargaining agreement were the equivalent of wages under the
circumstances. 351 As wages are a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining under the NLRA,352 the Court then held that Ohio could not
be allowed to frustrate the parties' agreement by the application of
state law to prohibit the wages reached in collective bargaining.
Federal law here created the duty upon the parties to bargain collectively;
Congress has provided for a system of federal law applicable to the agreement
the parties made in response to that duty . . .; and federal law set some
outside limits (not contended to be exceeded here) on what their agreement
may provide .... We believe that there is no room in this scheme for the
application here of this state policy limiting the solutions that the parties'
agreement can provide to the problems of wages and working conditions....
Since the federal law operates here, in an area where its authority is para-
mount, to leave the parties free, the inconsistent application of state law is
necessarily outside the power of the State.
3 5 3
However, the Court's analysis in Oliver suggested directly or im-
plicitly three exceptions to its rule of preemption. First, collective
bargaining terms dealing with permissive, rather than mandatory,
subjects of bargaining may not be equally immune from conflicting
state law.354 Second, in common with the Machinists doctrine, Oliver
preemption will not be required in areas where Congress has indi-
cated that the states may interpose their own law.355 Finally, the
Court suggested that a different result might be required where the
state law was one involving health or safety regulation.3 56 The Court
expressly rejected, however, one frequently encountered argument
under Garmon and Machinists; the fact that the state law in question
is one of general applicability rather than a measure specifically di-
rected to labor relations will not save the state law from
preemption. 35 7
348. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
349. Id. at 284-85.
350. Id. at 285.
351. Id. at 293-94.
352. See id. at 294-95.
353. Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
354. See id. at 294-95.
355. See id. at 296-97 n.10.
356. See id. at 297.
357. See id.
On its face, the holding in Oliver would seem to have little poten-
tial impact on state wrongful discharge remedies. States providing
such remedies do not enjoin or penalize the operation of collectively
bargained "just cause" and grievance-arbitration provisions, but in-
stead provide their own, independent remedy to employees generally,
a remedy that, in the case of a unionized employee, supplements
rather than replaces the collective bargaining agreement. The simi-
larity to Garmon in the Court's analysis cannot be escaped, however.
As previously discussed358 the Court does not possess under the
supremacy clause any general supervisory power over state courts. If
state law is preempted by operation of the supremacy clause, it must
therefore be because it conflicts with federal law, not a collective bar-
gaining agreement. This is essentially the analysis implicitly utilized
by the Court in Oliver. "Of course, the paramount force of the fed-
eral law remains even though it is expressed in the details of a con-
tract federal law empowers the parties to make, rather than in terms
in an enactment of Congress." 359
Supported in this manner, Oliver begins to look very much like a
more restricted version of the "arguably protected" branch of Gar-
mon. Since the wage rates in Oliver were the result of federally re-
quired mandatory bargaining, they were required, or "protected"
under the collective agreement and, hence, indirectly under federal
law. When the "arguably protected" branch of Garmon is seen in
this light as having been extended in Oliver to a state's effort to pro-
hibit or penalize conduct "protected" by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the extention of this concept to the "arguably prohibited"
branch of Garmon is indicated logically and it is in this respect that
Oliver threatened from the outset to preempt in the context of un-
ionized employees the state wrongful discharge remedies even then
being formulated.360
The Oliver doctrine lay essentially dormant for almost 20 years af-
ter Oliver was decided. In Malone v. White Motor Corp.,361 however,
the Court again returned to the asserted preemption of state law by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
Malone involved the attempted application of minimum standards
for vesting in a collectively bargained pension plan by the state of
Minnesota. Under the plan at issue, the employer had the right to
terminate the plan provided that it guaranteed payment of a pre-
358. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
359. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296-97.
360. By coincidence, what is widely recognized as the first of the modern wrongful
discharge remedies was established in Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), a case decided in the same year as Garmon
and Oliver. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
361. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
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scribed lower level of benefits to persons entitled to benefits under
the plan.362 Under the Minnesota statute, however, the employer
was required upon termination to guarantee full benefits to persons
with ten or more years of service.363 The effect of the application of
the state law was to require the employer to pay over $ 19 million
more in benefits than it would have been required to pay under the
terms of the collectively bargained plan.36 4
The central feature of Malone for present purposes is the unani-
mous reaffirmation by the Court of Oliver.365 The majority con-
cluded, however, that the Oliver exception permitting state
interference with the terms of collective agreements when Congress
has indicated an intent to allow such interference was satisfied under
the facts of Malone. This conclusion was based on an extended analy-
sis of the language and legislative history of the federal Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.36 6 The Court concluded that the lan-
guage and history of this Act "clearly indicate that Congress at that
time recognized and preserved state authority to regulate pension
plans, including those plans which were the product of collective bar-
gaining." 367  On this basis, the Minnesota statute was not
preempted.368
With Malone, the other Garmon shoe had dropped. The Minnesota
statute at issue was not, as in Oliver, an attempt by the state to pro-
hibit what the collective bargaining agreement required, but rather
an effort to establish minimum standards in the pension area. The
state was essentially saying by the statute that it had no wish to pro-
hibit any collectively bargained pension protection which parties
might privately have negotiated, but that, in all events, state law
would require at least the protection established by the statute. The
statute was thus an effort to prohibit conduct (i.e. the employer's ter-
mination of a pension plan without protecting vested rights) that the
362. Id. at 501.
363. Id. at 501-02.
364. Id. at 502.
365. The majority, although holding the state statute was not preempted for the
reasons set out in the text, noted, first, that its "conclusion is consistent with the
Court's decision in [Oliver]. ... Id. at 512. The Court also concluded that "we do
not depart from Oliver in sustaining the Minnesota statute." Id. at 514. The two dis-
senting opinions would both have held that the Minnesota statute was preempted
based on Oliver. See id. at 515-16 (Stewart, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
366. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09, repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Pro-
gram, 29 U.S.C. 1031(a) (1982).
367. Malone, 435 U.S. at 505.
368. Id. at 512-14.
parties' agreement in Malone also prohibited, albeit to a lesser de-
gree. To this extent, the application of the Oliver doctrine to the
Minnesota statute was analogous to the "arguably prohibited" branch
of Garmon.
The doctrinal structure of the Oliver doctrine was changed dramat-
ically in 1985 by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts. 69
In this case, a Massachusetts statute required that certain mental
health care benefits be provided to state residents insured under a
general health care policy or an employee health care plan covering
hospital and surgical expenses. 37 0 As applied to insurance policies
purchased pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, it was con-
tended that the Massachusetts statute was preempted as it effectively
imposed a contract term on the parties that otherwise would be a
mandatory subject of bargaining.3 7 '
Metropolitan Life should have been an easy case for the Court to
reach the conclusion that the Massachusetts statute was not pre-
empted. Four years earlier, in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,372
the Court had held preempted a New Jersey statute that the state
had sought to apply to bar offsets for workers' compensation pay-
ments from payments due under collectively bargained pension
plans. The state law was held preempted both under ERISA373 and,
citing Oliver, under the NLRA. "Where, as here, the pension plans
emerge from collective bargaining, the additional federal interest in
precluding state interference with labor-management negotiations
calls for preemption of state efforts to regulate pension terms."374
But Alessi, like Malone, involved an effort by the state to directly
supplement the benefits and protections provided by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. By contrast, the Massachusetts statute at issue in
Metropolitan Life made no effort to control the terms of collective
agreements but instead regulated a service, insurance, generally
available on the market within the state. It could no more be pre-
empted than could state gambling laws in the context of a collective
agreement that sought to guarantee slot machines in the cafeteria.
The mere frustration felt by parties precluded by state law from hav-
ing available within the state a service they would like to provide in
the collective agreement is patently not grounds for preemption
under Oliver or any other doctrine. The Massachusetts statute could
have been preserved from preemption on this ground alone.
Similarly, the Court could have routinely refused to preempt the
369. 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985).
370. Id. at 2383.
371. Id. at 2393-94.
372. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
373. Id. at 525.
374. Id. at 525.
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Massachusetts statute on either of two of the express Oliver excep-
tions. The state statute was clearly an effort by Massachusetts to
protect the health of its citizens, and Oliver itself would have pro-
vided ample support for upholding the statute. 375 Moreover, since
the statute was a direct regulation of insurance, an area that Con-
gress specifically saved from preemption even with respect to the ex-
press and sweeping preemption doctrine under ERISA,376 Oliver
again would have provided ample support for upholding the statute.
The Court, however, elected to reach the same result by an en-
tirely different road. Rather than recognize the analytical similarity
of the Oliver doctrine to Garmon, the Court elected instead to ana-
lyze the Metropolitan Life facts under the Machinists framework.3 77
Although the court of appeals in Malone had made a similar attempt
to compare Oliver to Machinists in a part of its analysis and had been
largely ignored by the Court, 378 in Metropolitan Life the Court sim-
ply noted, incorrectly, that its decisions had "articulated two distinct
NLRA preemption principles," Garmon and Machinists. Because
there was no contention that Garmon was applicable, the Court
seemingly assumed that Machinists must be by a process of elimina-
tion.379 Of course, after having determined that Metropolitan Life
should be governed by Machinists, the Court had to abandon any ef-
fort to apply the wholly inapplicable principles of Machinists to the
facts of Metropolitan Life. A doctrine based entirely on the need to
preserve economic weapons that labor and management are allowed
to employ by Congress, is not easily applicable as an explanation of
why a state's efforts to establish "minimum terms of employment" 38 0
are or are not preempted.3 8 '
Instead, the Court concluded that Congress had not considered
375. See Oliver, 358 U.S. at 297, discussed supra notes 330-40 and accompanying
text.
376. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (1982).
377. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2395.
378. If, under Machinists, "states cannot control the economic weapons of the par-
ties at the bargaining table, a fortiori, they may not directly control the substantive
terms of the contract which results from that bargaining." Malone, 435 U.S. at 503
(quoting White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 545 F.2d 599, 606 (1976)).
379. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2394-95. In fairness to the Court, however, the
parties also seemed to have uniformly urged the Court to apply Machinists. See id. at
2395.
380. Id. at 2397.
381. The argument was that Machinists was intended to protect the bargaining pro-
cess on the principle that the NLRA was merely a means to allow the parties to reach
agreement fairly. Id. at 2396. Thus, it was contended that "[a] law that interferes with
the end result of bargaining is, therefore, even worse than a law that interferes with
"whether state laws of general application affecting terms of collec-
tive-bargaining agreements subject to mandatory bargaining were to
be preempted."382 The Court was able to conclude, however, that the
"evil Congress was addressing," the inequality of bargaining power,
"was entirely unrelated to local or federal regulations establishing
minimum terms of employment."383 In this regard, the Court did not
consider that state minimum standards should be treated differently
from minimum federal standards, which had historically been held
not preempted by the existence of collective bargaining terms on the
same subject. 384 Moreover, the Court deemed significant the fact
that minimum state labor standards are, in a sense, laws of general
applicability, they "affect union and nonunion employees equally"38 5
and thus are standards 'independent of the collective-bargaining pro-
cess [that] devolve on [employees] as individual workers, not as mem-
bers of a collective organization.' "386 Finally, and "[m]ost
significantly," since the Court could discern no intent by Congress to
disturb state laws establishing minimum labor standards, such laws
were seen as conflicting with none of the NLRA goals, but rather
complementing what was perceived to be the congressional develop-
ment of "the framework for self-organization and collective bargain-
ing ... within the larger body of state law promoting public health
and safety."3 87
It is difficult to know what to make of Metropolitan Life. Both the
holding in Oliver, expressly reaffirmed in Malone, and the alterna-
tive basis of the holding in Alessi, are dismissed in Metropolitan Life
as dicta.38 8 Similarly, the Court's language is sufficiently broad to
support an argument that nothing is left of Oliver in any event.
When a state law establishes a minimal employment standard not inconsistent
with the general legislative goals of the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the
purposes of the Act.
• ..Though [the Massachusetts statute], like many laws affecting terms of
employment, potentially limits an employee's right to choose one thing by re-
quiring that he be provided with something else, it does not limit the rights of
self-organization or collective bargaining protected by the NLRA, and is not
preempted by that Act.
3 8 9
However, precisely because of the breadth of the Court's language, it
the bargaining process." Id. This is virtually the identical argument relied on by the
Eighth Circuit and ignored by the Court in Malone. See supra note 361.
382. Id. at 2396.
383. Id. at 2397.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745
(1981)).
387. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2398.
388. Id. at 2396.
389. Id. at 2398-99.
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is impossible to know whether the Court's view is actually as sweep-
ing as its language would suggest.
Assuming that Metropolitan Life overruled the Oliver doctrine at
least insofar as the rationale of its holding would suggest, it is still
another question whether that rationale is applicable to state wrong-
ful discharge remedies. Certainly such remedies are not laws of gen-
eral applicability in the sense that they apply solely to govern the
employment relationship rather than, as in Metropolitan Life, all of
the insurance policies sold in Massachusetts whether employment re-
lated or not. They are, however, laws of general applicability in the
sense suggested by the Court's language in Metropolitan Life in that
they apply to union and nonunion employers equally.
Similarly, it is far from clear that such remedies involve "minimum
labor standards" in the same sense as wage and hour laws or the min-
imum insurance benefits in Metropolitian Life. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, Metropolitian Life did not involve any interference with the
operation of the collective bargaining agreement's grievance and arbi-
tration provisions, long recognized as one of the primary goals Con-
gress sought to secure in the NLRA.390 The latter issue was directly
discussed by the Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,391 less than
two months prior to Metropolitan Life.
The employer in Allis-Chalmers maintained a disability benefits
plan pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.392 An employee,
dissatisfied with the manner in which the employer and its insurer
had handled his claim for benefits under the plan, elected to bypass
the agreement's grievance-arbitration procedure and file suit in state
court alleging that his claim had been handled in bad faith, a tort
under state law.3 9 3
The Court held the state cause of action in Allis-Chalmers pre-
empted under section 301 of the LMRA.394 Under this section of the
statute, which provides federal jurisdiction for suits brought to en-
force a collective bargaining agreement, the Court had historically
held that state courts may hear such suits, 395 but federal law must be
390. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1915 (1985); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
391. 105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985).
392. Id. at 1907.
393. Id. at 1908.
394. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
395. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1910 n.5 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962)).
applied.396 Since the Court in Allis-Chalmers viewed the state tort
suit as enforcing a duty that did not exist independently of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the suit was an indirect effort to apply
state law to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
and was therefore preempted.397
A "final reason" identified by the Court for preempting the state
claim in Allis-Chalmers was the Court's view that "only that result
preserves the central role of arbitration in our 'system of industrial
self-government.' "398 Thus, the Court identified as "[p]erhaps the
most harmful aspect" of not preempting the state suit to be the fact
"that it would allow essentially the same suit to be brought directly
in state court without first exhausting the grievance procedures
.... "399 The Court's concluding observations are critically impor-
tant to the preemption of state wrongful discharge remedies.
Since nearly any alleged willful breach of contract can be restated as a tort
claim for breach of a good-faith obligation under a contract, the arbitrator's
role in every case could be bypassed easily if § 301 is not understood to pre-
empt such claims. Claims involving vacation or overtime pay, work assign-
ment, unfair discharge-in short, the whole range of disputes traditionally
resolved through arbitration-could be brought in the first instance in state
court by a complaint in tort rather than in contract. A rule that permitted an
individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would cause arbitration
to lose most of its effectiveness . . . , as well as eviscerate a central tenet of
federal labor-contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court,
who has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract in the first
instance. 4 0 0
This language is typical of the Court's consistent position concern-
ing labor arbitration. It strongly suggests that, when ultimately con-
fronted with the question, the Court will hold state wrongful
discharge remedies40 i preempted to the extent they are made avail-
able to employees protected by the "just cause" and grievance-arbi-
tration provisions of collective bargaining agreements. The necessity
for such preemption is clear. If, as the Court recognizes in Allis-Chal-
396. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1910 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957); Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)).
397. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912-15. In effect, the Court's conclusion was that,
but for the collectively negotiated disability benefits, the plaintiff would have been en-
titled to nothing that bad faith could have been utilized to handle. Also, the Court
concluded that the measure of bad faith under the state law would at least in part re-
quire interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, as to which federal, not
state, law must be applied.
398. Id. at 1915 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1960)).
399. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
400. Id. at 1915-16 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
401. As previously discussed, state efforts to give contractual effect to promises of
job security set out in employee handbooks and personnel policies, when made known
to employees, should not be preempted. See supra notes 58, 329. In this context, how-
ever, even state claims based on this doctrine should be preempted as the employee's
collective agreement wholly displaces individual contract rights. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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mers as elsewhere, 402 there exists a strong congressional intent that
labor disputes be resolved by arbitration, and given that employee
discharge complaints form the largest component of labor arbitra-
tion,403 state efforts to provide alternative remedies and forums nec-
essarily conflict with the clear congressional intent and must
therefore be preempted.
It is much less clear, however how this result can be reached
within the context of the available labor preemption doctrines. Most
lower courts presented with the issue have held state wrongful dis-
charge remedies, other than the public policy torts, preempted under
section 301 when they are sought to be applied to an employee pro-
tected by a collective bargaining agreement.404 This is very difficult
to defend analytically. Section 301 simply provides federal court ju-
risdiction for suits "for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization ..... 405 However, in contrast to the state
bad-faith in claim processing tort held preempted in Allis-Chalmers,
state wrongful discharge remedies exist wholly independently of any
collective bargaining agreement. Although the Supreme Court ex-
pressly left open in Allis-Chalmers the possibility that "an independ-
ent, non-negotiable, state-imposed duty which does not create similar
problems of [collective bargaining agreement] interpretation" might
also be preempted,4° 6 the Court failed to indicate on what basis such
preemption might be found. Of course, the primary rationale of the
Court in finding the state tort claim in Allis-Chalmers preempted was
the Court's conclusion that the tort did not exist independently of
402. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 562-64 (1976); Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
403. C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 650 ("significant percentage" of cases reaching ar-
bitration involve discharge and discipline).
404. See, e.g., Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985); Olguin v. Inspira-
tion Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Eitmann v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 433 (1984); Buscemi v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984); Viestenz v. Fleming Compa-
nies, Inc., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982); Harrison v. United
Parcel Serv., 119 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2163 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Moore v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hosp., 116 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2691 (N.D. Cal. 1983), cff'd, 117 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 2688 (9th Cir. 1984); Watts v. Grand Union Co., 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 4211
(N.D. Ga. 1982); Dinger v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 112 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2420 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Danculovich v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, 110 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 2110 (W.D. Mich.
1982).
405. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
406. Allis.Calmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1914 n.11.
the collective agreement.407 After Allis-Chalmers, it therefore will
be very difficult to contend that section 301 can preempt state wrong-
ful discharge remedies. 408
There still exists, however, the Oliver doctrine and it is here that
the basis for preemption in this context can be found. The protection
of employees' job security through a "just cause" requirement for dis-
charge and the inclusion in the agreement of an arbitration proce-
dure to resolve claims that a particular discharge is not supported by
just cause are both clearly mandatory subjects of bargaining.409
There is also no indication that Congress wished to permit states to
interfere with the exclusive resolution of claims subject to the griev-
ance-arbitration procedure by providing alternative remedies and fo-
rums. Instead, as indicated by Allis-Chalmers and other cases,410
there exists an express congressional intent that the grievance-arbi-
tration process should be the exclusive procedure by which arbitrable
claims should be resolved.411 Finally, with the exception of certain
types of public policy wrongful discharge actions, it cannot be said
that state remedies in this area are intended to protect the health or
safety of the state's citizens. Parties to a collective agreement are re-
quired by the statute to bargain over protection for employees' job se-
curity and a grievance-arbitration procedure to enforce this
protection, Oliver, and more particularly Malone, clearly establish
that state remedies that "[limit] the solutions that the parties' agree-
ment can provide"412 are preempted. Since, as recognized most re-
cently in Allis-Chalmers,413 allowing state remedies in this context
directly limit the parties' "federal right to decide who is to resolve
contract disputes,"414 such remedies must therefore be preempted.
Metropolitan Life does not require a different result. As previ-
ously set out,415 the rationale of the Court in not preempting the
state statute at issue in that case rested largely on the fact that the
state statute was not viewed by the Court as conflicting with any of
407. Id. at 1912-15.
408. See id. at 1912 ("In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for
breach of (the collective bargaining agreement], it would be inconsistent with congres-
sional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or estab-
lish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.").
409. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940)(discharge protection);
United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 112 (1951)(arbitration), enforced as modified,
206 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954).
410. See supra note 385.
411. See also 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982) ("Final adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement.").
412. Malone, 435 U.S. at 513 (quoting Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296).
413. See Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915-16.
414. Id. at 1915.
415. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
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the basic goals of Congress in enacting the NLRA.416 It would be
hard to imagine any context in which this rationale would be less ap-
plicable than a state statute that frustrated the concept of the griev-
ance-arbitration procedure being the exclusive remedy for employee
discharge disputes.
There is, however, one aspect of the Court's decision in Metropoli-
tan Life that cannot be so easily dismissed. The Court noted in that
case that, were it to preempt the state statute there at issue, it would
"turn the policy that antimated the [NLRA] on its head" as it would
"[penalize] workers who have chosen to join a union by preventing
them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal
standards on non-union employers." 417 Of course, this is a concept
not generally transferable to the preemption of state wrongful dis-
charge remedies since a contractual requirement of "just cause" for
discharge, enforced by arbitration, is arguably greater protection
against unjust discharge than that available in the state courts418 and,
in all events, is clearly not, as in Metropolitian Life, an objectively
lower level of protection and, thus, a penalty associated with unioni-
zation. There is no question, however, that the availability of puni-
tive damages and, perhaps, the prospect of a sympathetic jury rather
than a "shop wise" arbitrator may make state remedies preferable to
at least some employees over "just cause" arbitration protection. To
this extent, the preemption of such remedies would work a penalty
on workers electing to unionize if such remedies were not generally
preempted, at least for all employees within the jurisdiction of the
NLRA.419 As previously discussed,420 however, there exist a number
of justifications that would support the general preemption under
Machinists of most state wrongful discharge remedies as applied to
employers and employees covered by the NLRA without regard to
whether or not they are organized. If preemption under Machinists
were required, there obviously would be no penalty for employees
electing union representation. Instead, there would be the traditional
reward of possessing, in most cases, the job security provided by the
usual "just cause" provision rather than the complete absence of such
security resulting from the preemption of the state remedies.
416. Metropolitan Life, 105 S. Ct. at 2396-99.
417. Id. at 2398.
418. See Catler, supra note 2, at 496-509.
419. Not all workers or employers are governed by the NLRA. See C. MORRIS,
supra note 64, at 1423-1503.
420. See supra notes 256-329 and accompanying text.
As discussed above, most courts have agreed, albeit by relying on
an inapplicable doctrine, that state wrongful discharge remedies are
preempted to the extent they are sought to be applied by employees
protected by a collective bargaining agreement.421 There has been,
however, a significant exception. Most courts have concluded that,
even in this context, state public policy torts are not preempted.422
This is a difficult result to justify.
Initially, none of the published analyses supporting a failure to pre-
empt public policy claims in this context had considered the preemp-
tive effect of the Garmon and Machinists doctrines. As previously
.set out, both doctrines are applicable in this context and each should
independently support preemption of claims of this nature. Simi-
larly, none of the cases have considered the implications of the Oliver
doctrine, which would, absent the applicability of one of the Oliver
exceptions, clearly require preemption.423 The rationale of Oliver is
particularly compelling in this context.
Employers and employees, through their union, have included arbi-
tration provisions in virtually all collective bargaining agreements424
for several reasons. Arbitration has the advantage of being quicker,
less costly, less public, and, usually, productive of better informed re-
sults than litigation.425 Of course, there are also disadvantages. By
virtue of being less costly, arbitration probably results in more al-
leged contract violations by employers, particularly alleged dis-
charges without just cause, being contested than would be the case if
every violation had to be made the subject of a lawsuit. Employees
are also disadvantaged to the extent that punitive damages and sym-
pathetic juries are unavailable in arbitration. But whatever its ad-
vantages and disadvantages, the exclusive remedy of arbitration for
421. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. Most commentators have reached
a similar conclusion. See, e.g., H. PERRIrr, supra note 3, § 2.26, at 65; Pincus & Gill-
man, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of Union Employees: What Effect
After the Demise of the "At-Will" Doctrine, 59 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1007, 1011-15 (1983);
State Actions, supra note 15, at 968-72; NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 645-47,
659-60.
422. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985); Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th
Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Kroger Co., 583 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-36 n.7 (S.D.W. Va. 1984);
Harper v. General Dynamics Corp., 117 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 3197 (S.D. Cal. 1984);
Sears v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Kazor v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 585 F. Supp. 621, 623 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Midgett v. Sackett-Chi-
cago, Inc., 105 Ill.2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1985); Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Hawaii 25, 677
P.2d 449 (1984), app. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest
Bell Tel. Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980); cf. Bald v. RCA Alascom, 569 P.2d 1328
(Alaska 1977). Most commentators have agreed with this result. See, e.g., State Ac-
tions, supra note 15, at 968; NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 660-62. But see Pin-
cus & Gillman, supra note 404, at 1012-15.
423. See NLRA Preemption, supra note 15, at 649-50.
424. See supra notes 310-18 and accompanying text.
425. See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 7-9.
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all contract disputes, including discharge disputes, is what the parties
bargained for. To allow state law to frustrate this intent by supplying
a state court remedy for public policy wrongful discharge claims
works a severe hardship on employers. They must still suffer the
disadvantage of having to defend large numbers of what probably
would otherwise be uncontested discharges because of the agreement
to arbitrate such claims. At the same time, they are confronted with
exactly the potential for expensive court litigation, punitive damages,
and hostile juries that the arbitration remedy was to avoid.426
State public policy torts are of recent origin and the full effect of
the availability of such claims, if the current trend of finding them
not preempted is continued, cannot yet be known. As such claims be-
come more widespread, however, it is probable that, in at least some
cases, employers will no longer be willing to agree to resolve dis-
charge claims by an arbitration procedure that cannot be made the
exclusive remedy for such claims.427 If this happens, it will frustrate
426. For an example of the use an imaginative court can make of the public policy
tort, see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
427. This was, and is, the concern in other areas. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Court determined that a federal court trial de novo of em-
ployment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982), was required even for employees covered by collective
bargaining agreements who had received an adverse award on the identical claim from
an arbitrator. The district court in that case had held that the employee's right to reli-
tigate his claim in federal court was precluded by the adverse arbitration award based,
in part, on the court's conclusion that any other result "would undermine substantially
the employer's incentive to arbitrate and would 'sound the death knell for arbitration
clauses in labor contracts." Id. at 54 (quoting from the district court's opinion, 346 F.
Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971)). The Supreme Court's rejection of this contention in
Gardner-Denver is widely relied on by the courts and commentators concluding that
state public policy torts are not preempted by the availability of a remedy in arbitra-
tion. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1375-76 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1.985); Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dolar, 666 F.2d 1309,
1320-21 (10th Cir. 1982); State Actions, supra note 15, at 967-68; NLRA Preemption,
supra note 15, at 657-59. Such reliance is seriously misplaced.
Initially, Gardner-Denver on its face has nothing to do with preemption under the
supremacy clause, the foundation for preemption under Garmon, Machinists, and Oli-
ver. Title VII is a federal, not state, remedy.
Secondly, although the Court did disagree with the district court's conclusion that
allowing the relitigation in federal court of unsuccessful arbitration claims would
threaten the continued willingness of employers to agree to arbitration of grievances,
see Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 54-55, the actual basis for its holding was that Con-
gress had intended for Title VII claims to be resolved by the federal courts, not arbi-
trators. See id. at 44-49. Of course, a congressional intent not to preempt a particular
type of claim is an exception under all of the preemption doctrines discussed in this
article. There is no similar congressional intent that states be permitted to resolve dis-
charge claims that are also arbitrable disputes under collective bargaining agreements.
Finally, the Court included in Gardner-Denver what has been described as "its now
clear congressional intent, repeatedly recognized and concurred in by
the Supreme Court, that arbitration be used to resolve industrial
disputes.428
To the extent that in this context a "sensitive balancing" 429 is re-
quired between the federal and state interests, the federal interests
weigh heavily in the balance. Allowing state public policy wrongful
discharge actions to proceed for unionized employees sacrifices to at
least some extent:
(1) the federal interest under Garmon of having arguably prohib-
ited conduct resolved by the Board or, in this context, by the
arbitrator under the Board's deferral doctrine;430
(2) the federal interest under Machinists of allowing unions the
economic weapon in organizational efforts of being the exclu-
sive source of job security against discharges other than those
violating federal statutory protections;431
(3) the federal interest under Oliver of allowing the parties'
agreement to arbitration, as a collective solution to a
mandatory subject of bargaining, be the exclusive remedy for
discharge claims free from state-by-state frustration;432
(4) the distinct federal interest expressly incorporated in the
NLRA and recognized in a litany of Supreme Court decisions
of allowing industrial disputes to be resolved by arbitration;433
and
(5) the national interest in precluding the further proliferation of
new remedies that directly and indirectly add to the cost of
doing business in this country to the disadvantage of Ameri-
can consumers and, ultimately, workers.
On the state side of the balance, there is the obvious state interest
in protecting employees from retaliation for such things as reporting
famous 'Footnote 21.' " See C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 33. Under this footnote, Gard-
ner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21, district courts hearing Title VII claims may admit the
adverse arbitration award into evidence and accord it "great weight" where the arbi-
trator has given full consideration to the employee's Title VII rights. Id. This concept,
administered by the federal courts, gives a degree of protection to employers faced
with redefending the same claim that state court juries cannot provide.
428. See supra note 385.
429. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 676.
430. See supra notes 71-255 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 256-329 and accompanying text. This interest is only slightly
less strong in this context where the union has already organized the employees. A
union is always subject to decertification attempts or a loss of its majority support and
consequent withdrawal of recognition by the employer. See generally Weeks, The
Union's Midcontract Loss of Majority Support: A Waivering Presumption, 20 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 883 (1984). For the same reasons a union needs its organizational weap-
ons to gain bargaining rights initially, it needs such weapons to maintain them. The
Machinists rationale therefore applies with almost equal force in this context.
432. See supra notes 330-405 and accompanying text.
433. See supra note 385.
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safety or health hazards, refusing to participate in, or covering up
wrongdoing, or filing workers' compensation claims. Phrased in these
terms, however, this is an interest that is significant only to the ex-
tent that alternative means of protecting such employees are either
nonexistent or ineffective. In the present context, the employees are
already protected by both an extremely effective remedy in arbitra-
tion434 and by subsequent Board review under its deferral doc-
trine.435 Essentially for this reason, at least some courts have avoided
preemption problems entirely in this area by refusing to extend
wrongful discharge remedies to employees protected by the availabil-
ity of arbitration.436
Therefore the only distinct state interest involved is the state's in-
terest in having its own forums and remedies, particularly punitive
damages, available to remedy and punish violations of the state's pub-
lic policy. While these interests are not insubstantial, the Supreme
Court's prior consideration of such interests does not suggest that
they will outweigh the federal interests. Thus, in Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox437 the Court recognized implicitly that the federal
interest in arbitration outweighs the state interest in its own forums
being available to resolve employee claims. In Jones,43s the Court
summarily dismissed the availability of punitive damages as sufficient
to avoid preemption under Garmon. If these interests are insuffi-
434. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
435. Under United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984), the Board will de-
fer a section 8(a)(1) charge filed by an employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement arbitration procedure. After the arbitration has concluded, however, a deci-
sion adverse to the employee is reviewed by the Board to determine: (1) whether the
issue under the Act (in this context, whether the employee's discharge interferred
with or restrained concerted employee activity) was presented to and considered by
the arbitrator, (2) whether the arbitration proceeding was "fair and regular,"
(3) whether all parties had agreed to be bound by the result, and (4) whether the
award is in any sense "repugnant to the policies of the Act." See Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). See generally C. MORRIS, supra note 64, at 957-77; MORRIS, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW at 249-51 (1st supp. to 2d ed. 1985).
436. See, e.g., Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985)(Ind.
law); Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983) (this case was effectively over-
ruled in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 85 Ill. Dec.
475, (1985)). At least one jurisdiction has apparently attempted to reach a middle
ground by holding the state remedy preempted where the employee has pursued the
arbitration remedy to a conclusion and not preempted where he has not. Compare
Thompson v. Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)(preemption) with
Richards v. Hughes Tool Co., 615 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991
(1982); Spainhouer v. Western Elec. Co., 615 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1981) and Carnation Co.
v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980).
437. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
438. Jones, 463 U.S. at 684.
cient to allow the state forum and remedies to escape preemption, it
is difficult to find a basis on which preemption in this context can be
avoided.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have contended above that, as applied to employers and employ-
ees governed and protected by the NLRA, and with the exception of
decisions giving contractual effect to job security provisions in em-
ployee handbooks and personnel policies when made known to un-
represented employees: (1) virtually all state "public policy"
wrongful discharge actions are preempted under Garmon, (2) some
kinds and, arguably, all types of state wrongful discharge actions are
preempted under Machinists, and (3) all types of state wrongful dis-
charge actions are preempted under Oliver when applied to currently
organized employees.
With respect to employers and employees not protected by the
NLRA, there is little question that the employment at will doctrine
has sometimes produced in harsh results. States may, if they wish,
seek to remedy this by providing state remedies and forums to regu-
late abusive discharges. These are the employees who must, if they
are to be protected at all, look to the state in the absence of a general
federal law on the subject.
As to employers governed and employees protected, by the NLRA,
however, Congress has already provided a remedy for abusive dis-
charge and, beyond this, any discharge not supported by "just cause."
It is called a union. For fifty years, the NLRA has worked well to
provide not only job security for American workers but a host of
other perceived advantages. If the Board is to go on providing effec-
tive, uniform remedies for violations of the Act's provisions protect-
ing employees against discharges that chill the exercise of their right
to engage in concerted activity, if unions are to continue to have the
use of one of their most potent organizing tools, and if the extremely
effective process of resolving discharge disputes in unionized settings
by arbitration is to be preserved, the supremacy clause requires the
wholesale preemption of state efforts to provide their own, individual
remedies and forums to employees covered by the NLRA.
